Research
Testing
Liquid Democracy
The question is what local delegation mechanisms can achieve on graph classes where liquid democracy is already known to improve epistemic welfare in the absence of attacks. Each voter can only delegate to available neighbors in the fixed delegation graph imposed by the mechanism, and the voter decides either to vote directly, or to delegate using local information to a neighbor allowed by the mechanism. The difficulty they present is that many individually sensible delegations can create globally concentrated terminal voting power. Even when that concentration is statistically acceptable, it may make a small number of delegates disproportionately valuable targets for capture (i.e. forcing them to vote a certain way).
I conjecture that on some graph classes where competence-based local delegation achieves positive gain and do-no-harm in the clean setting, local competence information alone is insufficient to preserve those guarantees against corruption of terminal delegates. The goal is to characterize the weakest additional information (like a local signal of expected terminal exposure through other delegation) that is necessary and sufficient to restore robust positive gain and do-no-harm, and to determine the largest corruption budget for which such guarantees are achievable. A tight result would therefore identify exactly how much nonlocal information robust liquid democracy requires, rather than just observing that concentrated delegates are vulnerable.
- Look for less restrictive cap in liquid democracy for different classes of graphs
- If competence is drawn from a distribution and/or make a more nuanced approval rule than for
Ideas and Brain Nonsense
Liquid Democracy + Sortition-style sampling
- If someone is selected, they can βdelegateβ someone to take their place, who can in turn delegate, etc. (sortition, then use LD delegation)
- Allow people to form a delegation network, then sample from the terminals (LD for delegation structure, then sortition)
- What is an application of Liquid Democracy outside of blockchain and politics?
- What is a non-contrived application of Fair Division outside of food?