Weekly Digest — November 15, 2026
Weather — West Lafayette, IN
2026-11-15: Overcast, 30-50F, 0% precip
2026-11-16: Overcast, 31-50F, 0% precip
2026-11-17: Partly cloudy, 31-57F, 0% precip
2026-11-18: Overcast, 39-60F, 0% precip
2026-11-19: Overcast, 45-64F, 0% precip
2026-11-20: Overcast, 47-66F, 1% precip
2026-11-21: Overcast, 45-62F, 24% precip
2026-11-22: Partly cloudy, 41-56F, 29% precip
Upcoming Events · 44
Sunday, Nov 15 · 1 event
- Pride & Prejudice — Sun Nov 15, 2:30 PM — Yue-Kong Pao Hall of Visual & Perf Arts · Purdue
Monday, Nov 16 · 8 events
AAARCC Language & Conversation Practice — Mon Nov 16, 1:00 PM — Asian American and Asian Resource and Cultural Center · Purdue
Historic Preservation Commission meeting — Historic Preservation Commission meeting November 16, 2026, 7:00 PM - 8:00 PM @ Common Council Chamber Historic Preservation Commission meeting 2026-11-16T19:00:00 Common Council C · Lafayette
Industry & Student Meet: Sustainability in Events & Hospitality Symposium — Mon Nov 16, 1:00 PM — Stewart Center · Purdue
ISO/ASO 9001 Certification Information — Mon Nov 16, 10:00 AM — Stewart Center · Purdue
More Details — Historic Preservation Commission meeting November 16, 2026, 7:00 PM - 8:00 PM @ Common Council Chamber Historic Preservation Commission meeting 2026-11-16T19:00:00 Common Council C · Lafayette
Purdue OWL Writers’ Room (KRCH 230) — Mon Nov 16, 9:00 AM — Krach Leadership Center · Purdue
Strategic Management Seminar Speaker featuring Libby Weber — Mon Nov 16, 10:30 AM — Jerry S. Rawls Hall · Purdue
The Supply Chain Challenge — Mon Nov 16, 6:00 PM — Jerry S. Rawls Hall · Purdue
Tuesday, Nov 17 · 9 events
AAARCC Vegetable Pop-up — Tue Nov 17, 12:00 PM — Asian American and Asian Resource and Cultural Center · Purdue
Board of Works and Public Safety Meeting — Board of Works and Public Safety Meeting November 17, 2026, 9:00 AM - 10:00 AM @ Common Council Chamber Board of Works and Public Safety Meeting 2026-11-17T09:00:00 Common Council · Lafayette
Cancelled: Lafayette Hearing Authority Meeting — Cancelled: Lafayette Hearing Authority Meeting November 17, 2026, 9:15 AM - 10:15 AM @ Common Council Chamber Cancelled: Lafayette Hearing Authority Meeting 2026-11-17T09:15:00 Com · Lafayette
Event Details — Board of Works and Public Safety Meeting November 17, 2026 20 N. 6th St. Event Details · Lafayette
Fall Undergraduate Research Expo - Poster Symposium — Tue Nov 17, 9:00 AM — Purdue Memorial Union · Purdue
More Details — Cancelled: Lafayette Hearing Authority Meeting November 17, 2026, 9:15 AM - 10:15 AM @ Common Council Chamber Cancelled: Lafayette Hearing Authority Meeting 2026-11-17T09:15:00 Com · Lafayette
Nobody - Chinese Film Appreciation — Tue Nov 17, 6:00 PM — Stanley Coulter Hall · Purdue
PMU Karaoke Night — Tue Nov 17, 6:30 PM — Purdue Memorial Union · Purdue
Purdue Bands & Orchestras Presents Fall Chamber Recital I — Tue Nov 17, 7:00 PM — St. John’s Episcopal Church · Purdue
Wednesday, Nov 18 · 10 events
CAPS Liaison Hours at AAARCC — Wed Nov 18, 4:00 PM — Asian American and Asian Resource and Cultural Center · Purdue
Explore Daniels Grad Programs — Wed Nov 18, 11:00 AM — Steven C. Beering Hall of Lib Arts & Ed · Purdue
Fall Undergraduate Research Expo - Research Talks — Wed Nov 18, 9:00 AM — Stewart Center · Purdue
GradSEA Writers’ Harvest — Wed Nov 18, 5:30 AM — West Lafayette Public Library · Purdue
Italian Movie Night - Welcome to the North — Wed Nov 18, 6:00 PM — Thomas S. and Harvey D. Wilmeth Active Learning Center · Purdue
Jazz Jams at PMU — Wed Nov 18, 7:00 PM — Purdue Memorial Union · Purdue
Nurse Blake ‘But Did You Die?’ Comedy Tour — Wed Nov 18, 7:00 PM — Loeb Playhouse - Stewart Center · Purdue
Purdue Bands & Orchestras Presents Fall Chamber Recital II — Wed Nov 18, 7:00 PM — St. John’s Episcopal Church · Purdue
Purdue OWL Writers’ Room (UNIV 235) — Wed Nov 18, 8:00 AM — University Hall · Purdue
Resume/CV Workshop — Wed Nov 18, 5:30 PM — Honors College and Residences South · Purdue
Thursday, Nov 19 · 7 events
2026 CATIA & SIMULIA Day @ Purdue — Thu Nov 19, 8:00 AM — Composite Manufacturing and Simulation Center · Purdue
Aviation Lecture Series featuring United Airlines Capt. Carole Hopson — Thu Nov 19, 6:00 PM — Fowler Hall - Stewart Center · Purdue
Gravity & Other Myths’ Ten Thousand Hours — Thu Nov 19, 7:30 PM — Loeb Playhouse - Stewart Center · Purdue
More Details — Redevelopment Commission Meeting November 19, 2026, 11:00 AM - 12:00 PM @ Common Council Chamber Redevelopment Commission Meeting 2026-11-19T11:00:00 Common Council Chamber 20 N. 6 · Lafayette
Pride & Prejudice — Thu Nov 19, 7:30 PM — Yue-Kong Pao Hall of Visual & Perf Arts · Purdue
Purdue Bands & Orchestras Presents Fall Chamber Recital III — Thu Nov 19, 7:00 PM — St. John’s Episcopal Church · Purdue
Redevelopment Commission Meeting — Redevelopment Commission Meeting November 19, 2026, 11:00 AM - 12:00 PM @ Common Council Chamber Redevelopment Commission Meeting 2026-11-19T11:00:00 Common Council Chamber 20 N. 6 · Lafayette
Friday, Nov 20 · 7 events
AAARCC Creative Media Team Meetings — Fri Nov 20, 4:00 PM — Asian American and Asian Resource and Cultural Center · Purdue
AAARCC Language & Conversation Practice — Fri Nov 20, 3:00 PM — Asian American and Asian Resource and Cultural Center · Purdue
Coffee at Convergence with Sam Miller — Fri Nov 20, 8:30 AM — Convergence Center · Purdue
Let Me Eat Your Pancreas - Japanese Movie Night — Fri Nov 20, 5:30 PM — Richard Benbridge Wetherill Lab of Chem · Purdue
Methodology Center Workshop Series: Data Visualization Workshop — Fri Nov 20, 1:00 PM — Stewart Center · Purdue
Pride & Prejudice — Fri Nov 20, 7:30 PM — Yue-Kong Pao Hall of Visual & Perf Arts · Purdue
Toastmasters at Purdue | Weekly Meetup — Fri Nov 20, 12:00 PM — 2501 Wang Hall Via Zoom · Purdue
Saturday, Nov 21 · 2 events
Pride & Prejudice — Sat Nov 21, 7:30 PM — Yue-Kong Pao Hall of Visual & Perf Arts · Purdue
Purdue Bands & Orchestras Presents Concert & Philharmonic Orchestras — Sat Nov 21, 7:00 PM — Long Center for the Performing Arts · Purdue
Conference Deadlines
- No future submission deadlines currently published on the tracked official conference pages.
Voting / Elections
Indiana voter portal — registration status, polling place, ballot
Official candidate lists — Indiana Election Division
Tippecanoe County Elections — local voting locations and notices
Reddit · 23 posts
r/purdue · 23 posts
YouTube · 33 videos
Alton Brown · 1 video
Answer in Progress · 2 videos
BeardMeatsFood · 2 videos
Beyond Babish · 1 video
Dylan Huynh · 1 video
Heliocentric · 2 videos
Insider · 2 videos
Jeremy Ethier · 1 video
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Quaker Videos · 4 videos
Renzy · 1 video
Sandwiches of History · 8 videos
Stewart Hicks · 1 video
Tasting History with Max Miller · 4 videos
Tom Scott · 1 video
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RSS Feeds · 9 items
Quaker Ranter · 2 items
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xkcd.com · 3 items
Newsletters · 33 messages
Catherine Elizabeth Cobb · 7 issues
[CS-COLLOQ] Online Biometrics Seminar - 11/12 @ 12:30-1:30 EDT — Tue, Nov 10
Please join
our online
bioinformatics seminar this week on
November 12th
(Thursday), 12:30-1:30 pm EDT.
Zoom Link:
https://purdue-edu.zoom.us/j/95979111762?pwd=ZplbO1xa5N87BMuCdsd4lTO6SvEMeB.1
Title: Toward an In Silico Tissue Laboratory: From Virtual Staining to Executable Tissue Modeling
Young H. Chang:
https://scholar.google.com/citations?view_op=list_works&hl=en&hl=en&user=6_o2blAAAAAJ&sortby=pubdate
Associate Professor, Dept. of Biomedical Engineering, Oregon Health and Science University
Abstract:
Questions, Comments, Request to speak in the seminar:
[email protected],
[email protected]
Sincerely,
Majid Kazemian
The Richard and Patricia Lawson Computer Science Building
305 N. University Street
West Lafayette, IN 47906
[CS-COLLOQ] Humble Programming, Revisited - Dr. Albert-Jan Yzelman 11/13 — Tue, Nov 10
The Richard and Patricia Lawson Computer Science Building
305 N. University Street
West Lafayette, IN 47906
[CS-COLLOQ] CS Colloquium: Yu Kong Title: From Physical Human to Physical Robots — Wed, Nov 11
The Richard and Patricia Lawson Computer Science Building
305 N. University Street
West Lafayette, IN 47906
[CS-COLLOQ] CS Colloquium - Huaicheng Li - Performance Criticality as a Foundation for CXL Memory Management — Thu, Nov 12
The Richard and Patricia Lawson Computer Science Building
305 N. University Street
West Lafayette, IN 47906
[CS-COLLOQ] CS Colloquium - Humble Programming, Revisited — Thu, Nov 12
The Richard and Patricia Lawson Computer Science Building
305 N. University Street
West Lafayette, IN 47906
[CS-COLLOQ] PurPL Seminar, Fri 11/20: Charith Mendis (UIUC): “Agile and evolvable software construction in the era of rapidly evolving hardware accelerator designs” — Fri, Nov 13
The Richard and Patricia Lawson Computer Science Building
305 N. University Street
West Lafayette, IN 47906
[CS-COLLOQ] Fw: PurPL Seminar, Fri 11/20: Charith Mendis (UIUC): “Agile and evolvable software construction in the era of rapidly evolving hardware accelerator designs” — Fri, Nov 13
The Richard and Patricia Lawson Computer Science Building
305 N. University Street
West Lafayette, IN 47906
CCL LafayetteIN · 1 issue
CCL Lafayette Meeting Next Thursday — Thu, Nov 12
Our Lafayette/District 4 chapter’s monthly meeting is next Thursday, November 19th, from 8:00 - 9:00 p.m. Please join us via Zoom video conference: https://citizensclimate.zoom.us/j/9813936069?pwd=Y0ppSEp3bm5oeDZMZ3hHeWxZVUJOdz09. If prompted, enter passcode 123. (Or launch the Zoom application: Join Meeting with Meeting ID: 981 393 6069. When prompted, enter passcode 123. You may also join by telephone: 312-626-6799, Meeting- ID: 981 393 6069. If you don’t have an unlimited minutes calling plan, use 855-881246, Toll-free.)
On the agenda (draft enclosed): updates from this month’s lobby meetings; organizing support for BAAJA; information about the Fall Virtual Conference in December; planning where to give CCL’s new introductory presentation; practice using the BRIDGE techniques in conversation.
Newcomers are very welcome–we’ll get you caught up and teach you how we do things!
Erin Moodie
Group Leader, Lafayette Chapter
Christos Alexandros Psomas · 1 issue
[THEORY-CS-SEMINAR] Relevant talk in QM seminar this Friday — Tue, Nov 10
Hi theory group!
There is a relevant talk in the QM seminar this Friday (see announcement at the end of this email).
Billy also said that they are looking for people to meet with the speaker. This is the
sign-up sheet.
Jingyan is on the job market this year, so students and postdocs who are currently on the market or will be soon may find it especially valuable to meet with her.
Cheers,
Alex
Time: Friday, November 13, 1:30–3:00 PM
Location: RAWL 1011
Title: The Double-Edged Sword of Information: Revealed versus Hidden Lotteries in School Choice
Abstract: In school choice, a lottery number is often used by the matching mechanism to break ties when there are more students who prefer the same school than the number of seats available. There has been growing theoretical and empirical interest in
understanding the impact of revealing the lottery number to students. In practice, in recent years, the NYC Public Schools started revealing the lottery number to students to improve transparency. Theoretical findings from prior literature also suggest that
revealing the lottery number strictly improves the number of matches under the deferred acceptance algorithm. However, these theoretical results are based on the over-simplifying assumption that all students share the same preference ranking for schools.
In this work, we relax this assumption and allow students to have heterogeneous preference rankings. Under a game-theoretic model where student strategies form a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, we characterize scenarios where revealing the lottery number can either
improve or worsen the matching outcome, measured by two metrics of match rate and social welfare. We further consider revealing partial information about the lottery, and demonstrate non-monotonic effects in the amount of information available to students.
These results together illustrate complex tradeoffs induced by the lottery revealing policy.
This is joint work with Parinaz Naghizadeh.
Bio: Jingyan Wang is a Research Assistant Professor at the Toyota Technological Institute at Chicago. She was previously a postdoctoral fellow at Georgia Tech, affiliated with the School of Industrial and Systems Engineering and the Algorithm and Randomness
Center. She received her PhD in Computer Science from Carnegie Mellon University and her B.S. in Electrical Engineering and Computer Sciences from UC Berkeley. She uses tools from statistics and machine learning to study the evaluation of people (e.g., in
hiring, admissions, and peer review) and of algorithms (e.g., in recommendation systems and language models). Her interdisciplinary research has been published in statistics, machine learning, artificial intelligence, human computation, and economics and computation.
She was the recipient of the Best Student Paper Award at AAMAS 2019, and was selected as a Rising Star in EECS and in Data Science.
Computer Science Graduate Student Board · 4 issues
[CS-PHD-STUDENTS] Town Hall this Friday! Also, AI workshop & merch design — Tue, Nov 10
Grad Town Hall Meeting: Friday, November 13th, 4:00 PM at DSAI 1069.
What: Immediately after social hour, we are holding a closed session with the CSGSB and grad students (no administration, staff, or faculty).
Why: Openly discuss your questions and concerns with us, which we will relay to the department. We will also answer concerns that we already know the answer to.
Also, we’ll be catering Panda Express.
Please
fill out a quick survey ahead of time with your concerns, whether you’re attending or not.
Your input is vital to our community! Anything from teaching assistant concerns, issues with advisors, or with courses, or anything else, are welcome to be brought up.
———–
The CSGSB is planning to put on an AI-focused workshop for graduate students next semester.
If you’re interested, please fill out this brief survey to help us gauge interest and identify potential topics.
———–
The CSGSB is putting together CS department shirts, polos, and hats for this year, and we’re looking for designs. You don’t need any design experience to submit, and rough sketches are welcome. The winning designer in each category will receive a free version
of the item they designed.
Please submit your design through this form by Friday, November 13 at 11:59 PM. Once submissions close, we’ll share the top designs with the department for a final vote!
Thanks,
Marc
[CS-PHD-STUDENTS] Townhall Today! Moved to LWSN 3102. Catered food & discuss your problems — Fri, Nov 13
Grad Town Hall Meeting: Friday, November 13th, 4:00 PM at LWSN 3102
Social hour was moved to LWSN last minute, so we’re moving to LWSN as well.
What: Immediately after social hour, we are holding a closed session with the CSGSB and grad students (no administration, staff, or faculty).
Why: Openly discuss your questions and concerns with us, which we will relay to the department. We will also answer concerns that we already know the answer to.
Also, we’ll be catering Panda Express.
Please
fill out a quick survey ahead of time with your concerns, whether you’re attending or not.
Your input is vital to our community! Anything from teaching assistant concerns, issues with advisors, or with courses, or anything else, are welcome to be brought up.
Re: [CS-PHD-STUDENTS] Townhall Today! Moved to LWSN 3102. Catered food & discuss your problems — Fri, Nov 13
Town hall is starting now! Come grab Panda Express and discuss your issues with the department.
From: Computer Science Graduate Student Board <[email protected]>
Sent: Friday, November 13, 2026 11:34 AM
To: [email protected] <[email protected]>
Cc: Computer Science Graduate Student Board <[email protected]>
Subject: Townhall Today! Moved to LWSN 3102. Catered food & discuss your problems
Grad Town Hall Meeting: Friday, November 13th, 4:00 PM at LWSN 3102
Social hour was moved to LWSN last minute, so we’re moving to LWSN as well.
What: Immediately after social hour, we are holding a closed session with the CSGSB and grad students (no administration, staff, or faculty).
Why: Openly discuss your questions and concerns with us, which we will relay to the department. We will also answer concerns that we already know the answer to.
Also, we’ll be catering Panda Express.
Please
fill out a quick survey ahead of time with your concerns, whether you’re attending or not.
Your input is vital to our community! Anything from teaching assistant concerns, issues with advisors, or with courses, or anything else, are welcome to be brought up.
Re: [CS-PHD-STUDENTS] Townhall Today! Moved to LWSN 3102. Catered food & discuss your problems — Fri, Nov 13
Hello all,
Thank you to everyone who attended the town hall and shared your concerns. We appreciate your feedback and for sticking around to bring up your issues to our attention.
I also want to emphasize that, while I tried to be candid during our town hall about the challenges facing the department, that should not be understood to mean that will not advocate on your behalf.
As graduate students, we are in the same boat as the rest of the graduate student body, and many of these issues affect us as well. We will be meeting with the administration on Monday, where we will raise the issues raised during the town hall (and via the
survey) and advocate for student interests. At the same time, we want to be realistic about expectations, given the current … state of affairs for most universities.
We will share the department’s responses with everyone by the end of next week.
Thank you again for participating in the town hall.
Best,
Marc
From: Computer Science Graduate Student Board <[email protected]>
Sent: Friday, November 13, 2026 3:58 PM
To: Computer Science Graduate Student Board <[email protected]>; [email protected] <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: Townhall Today! Moved to LWSN 3102. Catered food & discuss your problems
Town hall is starting now! Come grab Panda Express and discuss your issues with the department.
From: Computer Science Graduate Student Board <[email protected]>
Sent: Friday, November 13, 2026 11:34 AM
To: [email protected] <[email protected]>
Cc: Computer Science Graduate Student Board <[email protected]>
Subject: Townhall Today! Moved to LWSN 3102. Catered food & discuss your problems
Grad Town Hall Meeting: Friday, November 13th, 4:00 PM at LWSN 3102
Social hour was moved to LWSN last minute, so we’re moving to LWSN as well.
What: Immediately after social hour, we are holding a closed session with the CSGSB and grad students (no administration, staff, or faculty).
Why: Openly discuss your questions and concerns with us, which we will relay to the department. We will also answer concerns that we already know the answer to.
Also, we’ll be catering Panda Express.
Please
fill out a quick survey ahead of time with your concerns, whether you’re attending or not.
Your input is vital to our community! Anything from teaching assistant concerns, issues with advisors, or with courses, or anything else, are welcome to be brought up.
Dan Lewis, Now I Know · 6 issues
The Last Soviet — Mon, Nov 9
November 09, 2026 | Read online
Hope you had a good weekend. Today’s story starts off with me recounting an incident with bugs — sorry if it’s not great for a Monday AM! — Dan
The Last Soviet
A few years ago, my family returned from vacation to find a few surprises. Some mail we weren’t expecting, but nothing outrageous. Some spoiled food in the fridge. And — a lot of cockroaches. To this day, I’m not fully sure what happened, but some mix of a heating element in a dishwasher, combined with an intruder or two that we weren’t aware of, turned into a small infestation of bugs that we didn’t really want to deal with. That’s the risk of leaving your home for too long — sometimes you come back to the unexpected.
But cockroaches, while a bad surprise, aren’t international news. In the early 1990s, a man named Sergei Krikalev went away for a bit — and came home to find his country was gone.
On May 18, 1991, Krikalev — a flight engineer who had already done one tour aboard the Soviet space station Mir — launched from the Baikonur Cosmodrome along with commander Anatoly Artsebarsky and British researcher Helen Sharman. Sharman was only visiting; she’d be home in about a week. Krikalev and Artsebarsky were settling in for longer: per Discover, the plan was “a five-month mission packed with six spacewalks,” aboard a station no bigger than “a few RVs stacked end to end.” That comes with a lot of risks, but not one Krikalev expected. In August, things started happening back on Earth that had nothing, directly, to do with him, as communist hardliners tried to overthrow Mikhail Gorbachev and tanks rolled into Moscow. The coup collapsed within days, but the country underneath it was coming apart. “For us, it was totally unexpected,” Krikalev later said. “We didn’t understand what happened.”
The Soviet Union’s unraveling caused a weird quirk in the tiny universe of space taxiing. That three-person vessel that was supposed to go to the space station to relieve Krikalev was in Kazakhstan, which was trending toward independence. To keep Kazakhstan friendly, Moscow gave a seat to a Kazakh pilot. The other guest seat had already been sold to an Austrian who paid to fly. That left room for only one replacement, so a new commander, Aleksandr Volkov, came up to replace Artsebarsky. But that left no room for Krikalev’s replacement to come on board. Further, the Austrian researcher was scheduled to come home a week later with the Kazakh pilot, and Artsebarsky took the final seat on the return trip. Krikalev was supposed to be on that October trip back, but — because of the geopolitical turmoil back on Earth — agreed to remain in space until the following March.
Reporters soon called him “stranded,” but that isn’t quite right. A fresh Soyuz capsule stayed docked to Mir the whole time, ready to bring him and Volkov back to Earth. Leaving, though, could have meant abandoning the station, as Discover notes, so they stayed. Further, the dissolving Soviet Union was broke, and as Krikalev noted, keeping him up there saved money: “They say it’s tough for me — not really good for my health. But now the country is in such difficulty, the chance to save money must be (the) top priority.” His own pay, meanwhile, was worth just a few dollars a month by then, thanks to runaway inflation.
Down below, the map was being redrawn. Kazakhstan declared sovereignty and, as HistoryNet recounts, took control of the Baikonur Cosmodrome — and demanded a steep fee to keep using it. On December 25, 1991, Gorbachev resigned, and the next day the Soviet Union dissolved into 15 separate nations. The Russian newspaper Komsomolskaya Pravda summed it up bluntly: “A human race sent its son off to the stars to fulfill a concrete set of tasks. But hardly had he left Earth than it lost interest in those tasks, for worldly and completely explicable reasons. And it started to forget about its cosmonaut.”
On March 25, 1992, after 311 days in orbit, Krikalev finally landed near Arkalyk — in what was now the independent Republic of Kazakhstan. He launched as a Soviet citizen and landed as a Russian one. Discover describes him being helped out of the capsule “pale as flour and sweaty, like a lump of wet dough,” then wrapped in a fur coat and handed a cup of hot broth. He didn’t seem to mind, though. “There was a moment,” he recalled years later. “You couldn’t call it euphoria, but it was very good.”
Shortly before he came down, a reporter ran through the list for him: the Soviet Union was gone, Yeltsin had replaced Gorbachev, Leningrad was St. Petersburg. Which change surprised him most? “That at first, the Earth was dark, and now it’s white,” Krikalev answered. “Winter has come, and before it was summer.” From up there, you could miss the fall of a superpower. You couldn’t miss the snow.
My New Guide, In Case You Missed It
In Friday’s email, I shared something new: Hit Send: How to Build Your Own Newsletter, a 23-page guide for consultants, coaches, freelancers, and other one-person businesses who want a newsletter that actually brings in work.
Now I Know readers can get it for $29 — $10 off — with the code NOWIKNOW at checkout. It’s all at hitsendalready.com.
If you’re a paid supporter, it’s free. You got a separate email from me last Thursday with a code that takes it all the way down to $0, so check your inbox (and maybe your spam or promotions folder, just in case).
And thank you to everyone who sent feedback and kind words since Friday, and for all your support. It means a lot. — Dan
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More About Being in Space
Today’s Bonus fact: Being away from home for prolonged periods can hurt your relationships, and long trips to space are no exception. As the Digital Public Library of America notes, “There were thirty married astronauts during the Gemini and Apollo programs—all but seven marriages ended in divorce.” (The cause may have more to do with being in the public eye than absence, though; per DPLA, the astronauts’ wives at the time “were expected to personify a hero’s wife and provide support for their husband’s involvement in space missions,” and a lucrative deal with Life magazine opened their homes and private lives to the public.)
From the Archives: Voting in a Tin Can: At least his country was still there.
Support Now I Know!
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And thanks! — Dan
Newsletter links: Archive · Archive · Archive · Archive · Unsubscribe
Walk It Off — Tue, Nov 10
November 10, 2026 | Read online
Before we get started, a quick reminder about my “how to start your own newsletter” guide — learn more here and scroll down for the $10 off coupon. — Dan
Walk It Off
Most of us have, at some point, made a promise we never expected to have to keep. “If that happens, I’ll eat my hat.” “If they win, I’ll shave my head.” The point of a line like that isn’t really the hat or the haircut — it’s a way of saying how sure you are, and everyone involved understands that nobody is actually going to eat a hat. Most of the time, the thing doesn’t happen anyway, and the promise quietly disappears. Nobody’s keeping score.
But most of us aren’t radio hosts.
On June 8, 1989, the Pittsburgh Pirates were not a good baseball team. They came into Philadelphia that night having lost seven straight, and per Baseball-Reference, they were 21-34 — exactly as bad as the Phillies, the team they were about to play. Then, in the top of the first inning, everything went right. Pittsburgh sent 16 batters to the plate and scored 10 runs, including a three-run homer from Barry Bonds — the team’s best inning since September 1942. Up in the broadcast booth, Jim Rooker, a former Pirates pitcher turned announcer, was feeling good. As Shibe Vintage Sports recounts, he told the audience, “If we don’t win this one, I don’t think I’d want to be on that plane ride home.” And then, per UPI, he added the line that would follow him for the rest of the year: “If we lose this game, I’ll walk back to Pittsburgh.”
That was a mistake. The Phillies got two runs back in the bottom of the first and kept chipping away. Two unlikely sluggers led the charge: outfielder Von Hayes and shortstop Steve Jeltz, a player not exactly known for his power, each hit two home runs. By the end of the sixth inning, the Pirates’ lead was down to 11-10, and in the eighth, the Phillies scored five more. Final score: Phillies 15, Pirates 11. According to Baseball-Reference’s win-probability math, the Phillies’ chances had bottomed out at about 1%.
Rooker decided to take the team flight home anyway — but Pittsburgh fans had heard the promise, and they weren’t letting it go. The next day, the switchboard at Three Rivers Stadium lit up with calls asking whether he was going to actually go for the long walk — and, as the Pirates’ broadcasting director, Dean Jordan, told UPI a month later, Rooker “seems pretty headstrong on doing it.”
And ultimately, he delivered — after the season, and for charity. Billed as “Rook’s Unintentional Walk,” the trek would raise money for Children’s Hospital of Pittsburgh and Bob Prince Charities. On October 5, Rooker set off from Veterans Stadium with a companion, Pittsburgh businessman Carl Dozzi, and headed west, mostly along U.S. 30. Dozzi had trained for ten weeks; Rooker, figuring a former athlete didn’t need to, hadn’t. Within a few days, both men’s feet were swollen and blistered — Rooker later described “blisters on blisters” — and by the end, he was on his fourth pair of shoes, a size bigger than the pair he started in.
On October 17 — 13 days and, by UPI’s count, 337 miles later — the two men walked into Three Rivers Stadium behind a police escort, broke through a paper banner, and were greeted with champagne, balloons, and a portable foot bath. The walk raised an estimated $100,000 in pledges, about $15,000 of it from people they’d met along the way, and Rooker gave $10,000 to a former minor league teammate with multiple sclerosis to buy a van with a lift. Rooker called the whole thing “easier than spring training,” and said he’d learned his lesson: “I’m not going to open my mouth and insert my foot again.” After 337 miles, his feet had probably been through enough.
Rooker left the broadcast booth in 1993. These days, one of the voices on Pirates broadcasts belongs to a former pitcher who, per CBS Philadelphia, joined the team’s broadcasts when his playing days ended. He also happens to be the man who started for Pittsburgh on that June night in Philadelphia, giving up six runs and failing to make it out of the fourth inning — a detail Rooker, decades later, still found fascinating. His name? Bob Walk.
My New Guide, In Case You Missed It
Last Friday, I introduced Hit Send: How to Build Your Own Newsletter, a guide for people who run a one-person business and want a newsletter that brings in work. It covers picking a platform, writing your first issue, finding your first 100 subscribers, and sticking with it.
It’s $29 for Now I Know readers — $10 off — with the code NOWIKNOW, at hitsendalready.com.
Paid supporters, yours is free: look for my email from last Thursday with a $0 code (it may have landed in spam or promotions).
Thanks again for all the notes and support since Friday. — Dan
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More About Bad Bets
Today’s Bonus fact: Sometimes, you make a bad bet, like Rooker did above. But sometimes, you go way beyond that. In 2007, a businessman named Terrance Watanabe decided to press his luck at a pair of Las Vegas casinos, and found himself doing poorly. According to CBS News, he lost a total of $127 million that year — by one estimate, about 5.6% of the casino company’s Las Vegas gambling revenue.
From the Archives: The Nobel Prize Winner Who Bet Against Himself: Another long shot that paid off — for someone else.
Support Now I Know!
Now I Know is supported by readers like you. Yes, you! Many of my readers donate a few dollars a month to help Now I Know grow and thrive. And in exchange, they get an ad-free version!
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And thanks! — Dan
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Canada’s Not My Fault Button — Wed, Nov 11
November 11, 2026 | Read online
Happy Veterans Day — and Remembrance Day, to my Canadian readers. This is a re-run from 2017, and there’s a light tie-in to the date. — Dan
Canada’s Not My Fault Button
On September 1, 1939, Germany invaded Poland. Two days later, Britain and France declared war on Germany. World War II had begun.
At the time, Canada was one of a few “autonomous Communities within the British Empire” per the 1931 Statute of Westminster, making it a mostly-independent nation that was still part of the Crown, but had its own legislature and, for the most part, had the right to self-rule. Canada, to re-emphasize its independence, decided to wait a week before officially joining the fight; it didn’t declare war on Germany until September 10th. But the delay didn’t resonate with many of the young Canadian men and women who were eager to fight the Nazis. Once news hit that Britain was going to war, Canadians of service age signed up to serve in droves, despite the fact that they were not yet under any obligation to do so.
That is, they weren’t under any legal obligation to do so. Culturally, perhaps they were — as was true in Western Europe and would soon be true in the United States, there was an expectation that if you could serve, you would. Ultimately, roughly 1.1 million Canadians served during World War II, and the vast majority did so of their own volition; as Wikipedia notes, “around 10% of the entire population of Canada joined the army, a very small amount of which was conscripted.” Serving Canada was a point of pride.
Unless, of course, you didn’t serve — in that case, the shame of cowardice could find you. In World War I, for example, a British organization “aimed to shame [British] men into enlisting in the British army by persuading women to present them with a white feather if they were not wearing a uniform,” per Wikipedia; the white feather became a symbol of cowardice nearly immediately afterward. A similar specter haunted Canadian men who didn’t serve in World War II, and while there wasn’t a white feather-like symbol, the whispers of one’s neighbors served the same purpose.
For those who were unwilling to serve, perhaps that treatment was deserved — that debate is one for another publication. But what about those who were willing to serve but, through no fault of their own, couldn’t? Maybe, medically, the military found them unfit for service? Those people weren’t due the harassment, for sure — but were harassed nonetheless when they walked around in everyday attire while their siblings and neighbors donned uniforms and went off to war. That wasn’t fair, so the Canadian government stepped in with the solution pictured below.
That button is called the “Applicant for Enlistment” pin, and it comes in both French and English. Per Veteran Affairs Canada, Canada specifically created the pin to shield rejected applicants from the shame of not serving. The pin was made available to
Persons who have voluntarily declared their unqualified willingness to serve in and beyond Canada in the Military Forces of Canada, and who are refused enlistment by reason of their not possessing, due to no faults of their own, the necessary qualifications then required for enlistment in the Naval, Army and Air Forces of Canada.
Eligible people could pin it to their lapels in the hopes that the button would shield them from being called a coward — owning the medal meant you tried to serve but couldn’t, and were in no way a coward. (Well, at least not when it came to the war.) And if you didn’t earn the medal and were caught with it? That came with a $500 fine (in Canadian dollars), which, accounting for inflation, is close to $8,000 today.
Whether the button successfully delivered on its mission, though, is murky at best. Canada didn’t start issuing the badge until the fall of 1941, and while the button was issued retroactively to the war’s start, some were surely harangued during that two-year interval.
Get Up to $200 in Free Stuff on Whatnot
Whatnot is the hot new live commerce site — basically, lots of people selling lots of stuff, live (especially collectables, which is why I care). They’re offering a random credit — $200 tops, $10 minimum — to Now I Know readers that sign up. (I got $10, not $200. But it’s better than nothing, right?)
So give it a try, and if you end up buying something, they’ll give me another $10+, too. And that’s pretty cool because I really like baseball collectables.
Sign up here and get your $10 (and hopefully the full $200!).
Today’s Bonus fact: During the course of World War II, Canada declared war on Germany, Italy, Finland, Hungary, Romania, and Japan. These were the first times Canada made a formal declaration of war — and, so far, the last times, too, as Canada has not declared war since.
From the Archives: Superman Versus the Klan: Turned away by the Army, he found a different fight.
Support Now I Know!
Now I Know is supported by readers like you. Yes, you! Many of my readers donate a few dollars a month to help Now I Know grow and thrive. And in exchange, they get an ad-free version!
Interested in supporting Now I Know? Click here!
And thanks! — Dan
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WOW! You’ve been reading Now I Know for TWO MONTHS! — Wed, Nov 11
Hi!
It’s been about two months since you first joined Now I Know — and I just want to say thank you for being part of this curiosity journey.
Over the last 15+ years, this newsletter has grown into a community of readers who share one simple love: learning something new every day. I couldn’t do it without you.
If you’ve enjoyed the stories so far, here are a few next steps you might like:
Share Now I Know with a friend — curiosity is even better when it’s shared.
Support the newsletter with a few bucks a month — supporters help keep it free for everyone. (And you get an ad-free version!)
However you choose to stay engaged, I’m grateful you’re here. Here’s to many more months of learning together!
Dan
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Herb Your Enthusiasm — Thu, Nov 12
November 12, 2026 | Read online
This is about Burger King but because it’s about Herb, I keep thinking KFC. — Dan
Herb Your Enthusiasm
If you’ve ever read a certain children’s book about a reclusive candy maker — or seen either of the movies — you know how marketing-based contests are supposed to work. A company hides a handful of Golden Tickets inside its product, kids everywhere tear open wrappers by the thousands, and the lucky few who find one win the prize of a lifetime. (If they’re not rotten, at least.) The company sells a lot more candy, and everyone goes home happy.
But sometimes, you just piss off your customers instead.
In late 1985, Burger King was a distant second to McDonald’s in the hamburger wars, so its ad agency, J. Walter Thompson, came up with a $40 million campaign, per Time, built around a man who had never tasted a Whopper. His name was Herb. The ads taunted him — “What are you waiting for, Herb?” read one — and then, after six weeks of build-up, Herb finally appeared in an ad during the January 1986 Super Bowl. He turned out to be a balding nerd in thick glasses and white socks, and he admitted that he’d tried a Burger King burger and loved it.
Then Herb — actor Jon Menick, plucked from a pool of 75 actors — went on a 25-day tour of Burger King restaurants in all 50 states, becoming, effectively, a human Golden Ticket. The first person to spot him at a given Burger King would win $5,000. It was a fun way to get people to show up at their local BKs.
But there was a problem: what if someone who was supposed to be in school cut class to go find Herb? So Burger King — quietly — added a rule to the contest: you had to be at least 16 years old to collect. They probably did it just to be safe; as one franchise owner explained to UPI, the idea was “to keep youngsters from skipping school and hanging out at Burger Kings waiting for ‘Herb.’” And they likely never expected it to become a big deal.
The opposite happened: the no-Herbing-under-16 rule overwhelmed the rest of the story. In February, the first person to spot Herb in Reno, Nevada, was Terry Taylor, who had just turned 15. Per UPI, Burger King’s national officials ruled that he was too young to collect, so the restaurant’s owners gave him $5,000 out of their own pockets. “I saw the disappointment in his eyes,” co-owner Don White explained. The franchisee took the hit rather than upset the young customer and his community.
Corporate, though, didn’t follow suit. In March of that year, as Time reported, 15-year-old Jason Hallman of Bessemer, Alabama, became the first person in his state to spot Herb — and when Burger King learned his age, it gave the $5,000 to his friend, 16-year-old David Brown, who was with him. Hallman’s parents complained to their state senator, Mac Parsons, and the Alabama Senate passed a resolution denouncing Burger King for “consumer fraud,” concluding that the company had never made the rules clear in its advertising. Parsons was blunt: “I feel what Burger King did was as bad as what the Grinch did when he stole Christmas.”
By then, Herb’s days were numbered anyway. In May 1986, Burger King dropped him for a campaign about “real people eating real food,” and company president Jay Darling gave Herb a lukewarm send-off, simply stating that “it did not work nearly as well as I hoped.” By late 1987, Fortune reported, Burger King’s profits had slid 40% in a year, and J. Walter Thompson had lost the $200 million Burger King account.
Fortune’s summary of Herb: the campaign “not only failed to attract customers, but also managed to insult just about anybody who wears white socks and everybody named Herb.” And it also turned the Alabama Senate into a roomful of Veruca Salts.
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More About Burger King’s Bad Year
Today’s Bonus fact: Herb wasn’t Burger King’s only misfire that spring. In the same May 1986 announcement, per UPI, Darling said the company had launched a $30 million ad blitz in March for a new menu item called Chicken Tenders. The ads had to be pulled after three weeks, because the restaurants ran out of chicken and needed time to find more suppliers.
From the Archives: Not Even Baby Yoda Knows How to Drive: Close, but no Toyota.
Support Now I Know!
Now I Know is supported by readers like you. Yes, you! Many of my readers donate a few dollars a month to help Now I Know grow and thrive. And in exchange, they get an ad-free version!
Interested in supporting Now I Know? Click here!
And thanks! — Dan
Newsletter links: Archive · Archive · Archive · Archive · Unsubscribe
What’s the Story That Stuck With You? — Fri, Nov 13
November 13, 2026 | Read online
Happy Friday! If you’re new to Now I Know, you’ll notice that today’s format differs from the rest of the week. On Fridays, I pause to write the “Weekender,” my “week in review” type of thing, or to share something else I think you may find interesting. Thanks for reading! — Dan
What’s the Story That Stuck With You?
Hi!
This is another in my loose series of asking you for feedback 😀
I’ve written nearly (maybe more than?) 3,000 Now I Know stories, and while I don’t have a favorite, you might. My friend Marlene really liked discovering the tale of Whittier, Alaska, the town that lives all in one building. And last week, reader Terry D. emailed me to tell me that one about a vegetable you can actually hear growing keeps coming up in her conversations.
Terry also had an idea — one I really like, so I’m taking her advice. She suggested that I ask all of you which Now I Know story always sticks in your mind. It’s a great idea because I honestly don’t know which ones stick. I can look up which ones got the most clicks, but that’s not the same thing. I want to know the one you bring up at dinner, or that pops into your head in the produce aisle — the one you find yourself telling other people about.
So: what’s yours? It’s one question, and you don’t need to remember the title. Just tell me what you remember about it (and why it stuck, if you’d like). I created a very short form so you can tell me the story that stuck with you — just click that link.
And yes, I’ll share your favorites with everyone else. I’ll probably do that in an end-of-year recap of all-time favorites. But — shh, this is a secret — I’m also working on a fun, kind of odd, and creative way to highlight some specific stories. More to come on that, but if you want me to credit you in what I’m making, I’ll need to know who you are. The form has a place for your name — if you want to share it, please do.
I’m really looking forward to reading these — thanks!
Get Up to $200 in Free Stuff on Whatnot
Whatnot is the hot new live commerce site — basically, lots of people selling lots of stuff, live (especially collectables, which is why I care). They’re offering a random credit — $200 tops, $10 minimum — to Now I Know readers that sign up. (I got $10, not $200. But it’s better than nothing, right?)
So give it a try, and if you end up buying something, they’ll give me another $10+, too. And that’s pretty cool because I really like baseball collectables.
Sign up here and get your $10 (and hopefully the full $200!).
The Now I Know Week In Review
Monday: The Last Soviet: Some things change while you’re out of the office.
Tuesday: Walk It Off: Talk is cheap. Walking, not so much.
Wednesday: Canada’s Not My Fault Button: Wear it with pride. Sort of.
Thursday: Herb Your Enthusiasm: You get nothing! Good day, sir!
A Few Dollars = A Big Difference
Now I Know is supported by readers like you. Yes, you! Many of my readers donate a few dollars a month to help Now I Know grow and thrive. And in exchange, they get an ad-free version!
To become a monthly supporter via the newsletter’s Support page, click here. If you do, you’ll get the ad-free version going forward!
To become a one-time supporter via PayPal, click here.
To become a one-time supporter via Venmo, click here — I’m @DanDotLewis
And thanks! — Dan
Long Reads and Other Things
Here are a few things you may want to check out over the weekend:
1) “Rays of Wonder” (VQR, 25 minutes, October 2026). The early, reckless history of the X-ray — from Wilhelm Röntgen’s first image of his wife’s hand to Thomas Edison’s injured assistant — woven together with the author’s own family medical history.
2) “Fake film deals and emails from top agents: who is behind the explosion in literary scams?” (The Guardian, 18 minutes, October 2026). The subhead: “Writers are being bombarded daily with invitations from fake book groups and offers to publicize their work. For the scamming industry, aspiring authors can be a soft touch.” When I wrote my books, this didn’t happen — well, not to me, at least. Maybe I just wasn’t popular enough!
3) “Ivan the Terrible Wanted to Marry Elizabeth I. How Did England’s ‘Virgin Queen’ Reject the Russian Czar Without Souring Trade Relations?” (Smithsonian, 10 minutes, October 2026). The economics and politics of the 1500s were weird.
Have a great weekend!
Dan
Newsletter links: Archive · Archive · Unsubscribe
Ethan Edward Mader · 2 issues
[THEORY-CS-SEMINAR] THURSDAY at 3PM: Ethan Mader and Borna Tavasoli - *DSAI 1069* — Tue, Nov 10
Abstract: Edit distance is a classic problem in theoretical computer science, with applications ranging from computational biology to text processing. While the classical dynamic programming algorithm runs in quadratic time, conditional lower bounds
based on SETH (which is now false) suggest that a strongly subquadratic exact algorithm is unlikely. This has motivated decades of research into faster approximation algorithms, with a recent breakthrough from OpenAI.
In September 2026, OpenAI gave a randomized algorithm that computes a (1+ε)-approximation to edit distance in expected time n^(1+o(1)) for any fixed ε > 0, dramatically improving upon previous approximation algorithms in both the runtime and approximation.
In this talk, we will review some relevant history of edit distance algorithms and explain where the main ideas in the new result come from.
Hope to see you there!
[THEORY-CS-SEMINAR] TODAY at 3PM: Ethan Mader and Borna Tavasoli - *DSAI 1069* — Thu, Nov 12
Abstract: Edit distance is a classic problem in theoretical computer science, with applications ranging from computational biology to text processing. While the classical dynamic programming algorithm runs in quadratic time, conditional lower bounds
based on SETH (which is now false) suggest that a strongly subquadratic exact algorithm is unlikely. This has motivated decades of research into faster approximation algorithms, with a recent breakthrough from OpenAI.
In September 2026, OpenAI gave a randomized algorithm that computes a (1+ε)-approximation to edit distance in expected time n^(1+o(1)) for any fixed ε > 0, dramatically improving upon previous approximation algorithms in both the runtime and approximation.
In this talk, we will review some relevant history of edit distance algorithms and explain where the main ideas in the new result come from.
Hope to see you there!
Isaac Saul · 1 issue
Did you mean to unsubscribe? — Sun, Nov 8
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Three quick things before you go:
Newsletter links: Unsubscribe · Unsubscribe
Jennifer Tyler · 1 issue
Re: Quick Questionnaire - Tell us more about you! — Tue, Nov 10
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L. Varinia Barreto · 1 issue
[CS-PHD-STUDENTS] 🎉 Last CS Grad Social Hour of the Semester – Diwali Edition! — Thu, Nov 12
Dear CS,
It’s almost time for our last Social Hour of the semester! 🎉
Join us this Friday, November 13, for an afternoon of fun! (And please make sure you read all the way to the bottom for our usual rules and expectations!)
This time, we’ll be celebrating Diwali, the Festival of Lights, with some Indian-inspired snacks!
CS Grad Social Hour – Diwali Edition!
📅 Friday, November 13, 2026
🕒 3:00 PM – 4:00 PM
📍 LWSN Commons
What can you expect?
🥭 Tasty Indian treats
☕ Coffee and other drinks
💬 Good conversations
🚨 The Usual CS Social Hour Rules Apply!
🍬 Start small! Please take one piece of each item so everyone gets a chance to try everything. You can always come back for seconds if we have leftovers!
♻️ Plate + cup = stack! When you’re finished, please stack your plate and cup in the designated containers. Check the signs to make sure everything goes in the right place.
🌱 Bring your own mug or cup! Help us reduce waste and save a few disposable cups from a very short career. 🌎☕
🎓 A quick reminder: Social Hour is exclusively for CS graduate students, faculty, and staff. Please bring your PUID or Purdue Mobile ID, along with a fellow CS graduate student!
And finally… the most important rule of all: Bring yourself and a fellow CS friend! 😂
Looking forward to seeing you all! It’s been such a pleasure organizing these Social Hours and spending time with this wonderful community!
Varinia
CS Grad Office
Patricia Ann Morgan · 2 issues
[CS-PHD-STUDENTS] Join Us for Coffee & Pastries with Old Master/Rising Professional - Dr. Amber Johnson Avery (CS PhD 2019) Wed, Nov 11 — Tue, Nov 10
Coffee & Pastries with Old Master/Rising Professional - Dr. Amber Johnson Avery (CS PhD 2019)
Wed, Nov 11
9:30 - 11:30am
LWSN 3102
Join us for a discussion with Dr. Amber Johnson Avery, as she shares her professional experiences and career development.
Rising Professional, Dr. Amber Johnson Avery,
Dr. Amber Johnson Avery is the co-founder of NextGenEdu, a technology company advancing career discovery and workforce development for students. She made history as the first Black woman to earn a PhD in Computer
Science from Purdue University. With experience spanning software engineering, research, and entrepreneurship, she develops innovative technologies that expand access to opportunity and empower the next generation. Dr. Avery holds a Computer Science MS and
PhD from Purdue University. She serves on several nonprofit boards, including The Bean Path, supporting technology and entrepreneurship initiatives.
Patricia Morgan
Administrative Assistant, Corporate & Alumni Relations
Computer Science Department
Lawson Computer Science Building
305 N University St
West Lafayette, IN 47907
Phone: (765) 494-5322 Fax: (765) 494-0739
[CS-PHD-STUDENTS] Reminder: Join Us for Coffee & Pastries with Old Master/Rising Professional - Dr. Amber Johnson Avery (CS PhD 2019) Wed, Nov 11 — Wed, Nov 11
Coffee & Pastries with Old Master/Rising Professional - Dr. Amber Johnson Avery (CS PhD 2019)
Wed, Nov 11
9:30 - 11:30am
LWSN 3102
Join us for a discussion with Dr. Amber Johnson Avery, as she shares her professional experiences and career development.
Rising Professional, Dr. Amber Johnson Avery,
Dr. Amber Johnson Avery is the co-founder of NextGenEdu, a technology company advancing career discovery and workforce development for students. She made history as the first Black woman to earn a PhD in Computer
Science from Purdue University. With experience spanning software engineering, research, and entrepreneurship, she develops innovative technologies that expand access to opportunity and empower the next generation. Dr. Avery holds a Computer Science MS and
PhD from Purdue University. She serves on several nonprofit boards, including The Bean Path, supporting technology and entrepreneurship initiatives.
Patricia Morgan
Administrative Assistant, Corporate & Alumni Relations
Computer Science Department
Lawson Computer Science Building
305 N University St
West Lafayette, IN 47907
Phone: (765) 494-5322 Fax: (765) 494-0739
[email protected] · 1 issue
Weekly Digest — Nov 08, 2026 — Sun, Nov 8
Weekly Digest — November 08, 2026
PDF version
Weather — West Lafayette, IN
2026-11-08: Clear, 33-62F, 0% precip
2026-11-09: Overcast, 36-60F, 0% precip
2026-11-10: Clear, 40-65F, 1% precip
2026-11-11: Rain showers, 48-63F, 39% precip
2026-11-12: Light drizzle, 36-50F, 37% precip
2026-11-13: Light snow, 32-39F, 15% precip
2026-11-14: Overcast, 30-44F, 3% precip
2026-11-15: Overcast, 34-59F, 2% precip
Upcoming Events — Nov 08–Nov 15
Mon Nov 9: AAARCC Language & Conversation Practice — Mon Nov 9, 1:00 PM — Asian American and Asian Resource and Cultural Center [Purdue]
Mon Nov 9: Field of Flags — Mon Nov 9, 12:00 AM — Purdue Memorial Union [Purdue]
Mon Nov 9: Purdue OWL Writers’ Room (KRCH 230) — Mon Nov 9, 9:00 AM — Krach Leadership Center [Purdue]
Tue Nov 10: AAARCC Vegetable Pop-up — Tue Nov 10, 12:00 PM — Asian American and Asian Resource and Cultural Center [Purdue]
Tue Nov 10: Board of Works and Public Safety Meeting — Board of Works and Public Safety Meeting November 10, 2026, 9:00 AM - 10:00 AM @ Common Council Chamber Board of Works and Public Safety Meeting 2026-11-10T09:00:00 Common Council [Lafayette]
Tue Nov 10: Echoes of Excellence — Tue Nov 10, 5:00 PM — Fowler Hall - Stewart Center [Purdue]
Tue Nov 10: Event Details — Board of Works and Public Safety Meeting November 10, 2026 20 N. 6th St. Event Details [Lafayette]
Tue Nov 10: Field of Flags — Tue Nov 10, 12:00 AM — Purdue Memorial Union [Purdue]
Tue Nov 10: Film Screening: Yale Strom’s “Carpati: 50 Miles, 50 Years” — Tue Nov 10, 7:30 PM — Krannert Building [Purdue]
Tue Nov 10: More Details — Board of Works and Public Safety Meeting November 10, 2026, 9:00 AM - 10:00 AM @ Common Council Chamber Board of Works and Public Safety Meeting 2026-11-10T09:00:00 Common Council [Lafayette]
Tue Nov 10: PMU Trivia Night — Tue Nov 10, 6:30 PM — Purdue Memorial Union [Purdue]
Tue Nov 10: Talk Grad to Me — Tue Nov 10, 6:00 PM — Jerry S. Rawls Hall [Purdue]
Tue Nov 10: That summer in Paris - French Film Festival — Tue Nov 10, 6:30 PM — Stanley Coulter Hall [Purdue]
Tue Nov 10: The Mix Event featuring Chris Nilsen — Tue Nov 10, 4:30 PM — Walt’s Pub & Grill [Purdue]
Tue Nov 10: When the Violin Speaks: Klezmer, Memory and Jewish Life — Tue Nov 10, 4:30 PM — West Lafayette Public Library [Purdue]
Wed Nov 11: CAPS Liaison Hours at AAARCC — Wed Nov 11, 4:00 PM — Asian American and Asian Resource and Cultural Center [Purdue]
Wed Nov 11: Celebrating 250 Years of American Music / MUSIC DEPARTMENT CONCERT — Wed Nov 11, 12:30 PM — Patti and Rusty Rueff Galleries - Pao Hall [Purdue]
Wed Nov 11: DIY: Art Cart Drop-In — Wed Nov 11, 4:00 PM — Purdue Memorial Union [Purdue]
Wed Nov 11: Field of Flags — Wed Nov 11, 12:00 AM — Purdue Memorial Union [Purdue]
Wed Nov 11: Klezmer Music Workshop — Wed Nov 11, 4:00 PM — Marc and Sharon Hagle Hall [Purdue]
Wed Nov 11: Mapping Opportunity in the Amazon region: Field Challenges and Geospatial Approaches to Sustainable Forest Use — Wed Nov 11, 3:00 PM — Philip E. Nelson Hall of Food Science [Purdue]
Wed Nov 11: Purdue OWL Writers’ Room (UNIV 235) — Wed Nov 11, 8:00 AM — University Hall [Purdue]
Wed Nov 11: Unlocking the Presidential Puzzle(s) with Mara Faccio — Wed Nov 11, 11:30 AM — Jerry S. Rawls Hall [Purdue]
Wed Nov 11: Veterans Day Ceremony — Wed Nov 11, 11:00 AM — Purdue Memorial Union [Purdue]
Thu Nov 12: 2026 SUPPLY CHAIN CONSULTING LECTURE SERIES — Thu Nov 12, 4:30 PM — Jerry S. Rawls Hall [Purdue]
Thu Nov 12: AAARCC Book Series: Screening Precarity — Thu Nov 12, 12:00 PM — Asian American and Asian Resource and Cultural Center [Purdue]
Thu Nov 12: ASC Workshop; “Mini” practice your POMO — Thu Nov 12, 7:00 PM — Harvey W. Wiley Residence Hall [Purdue]
Thu Nov 12: Field of Flags — Thu Nov 12, 12:00 AM — Purdue Memorial Union [Purdue]
Thu Nov 12: Pride & Prejudice — Thu Nov 12, 7:30 PM — Yue-Kong Pao Hall of Visual & Perf Arts [Purdue]
Thu Nov 12: Purdue Bands & Orchestras Presents Jazz Bands — Thu Nov 12, 7:00 PM — Loeb Playhouse - Stewart Center [Purdue]
Thu Nov 12: Purdue GIS Day 2026: Cyber GIS & Geospatial Data Science — Thu Nov 12, 8:00 AM — Stewart Center [Purdue]
Thu Nov 12: Purdue Visiting Writers Series — Thu Nov 12, 7:00 PM — Krannert Building [Purdue]
Thu Nov 12: Yale Strom & Hot Pstromi Free Concert — Thu Nov 12, 4:00 PM — Fowler Hall - Stewart Center [Purdue]
Fri Nov 13: A Decade of Collective Remembrance: An Art Exhibition Commemorating the Victims of the Philippine War on Drugs — Fri Nov 13, 12:00 AM — Helen B. Schleman Hall of Student Servcs [Purdue]
Fri Nov 13: AAARCC Creative Media Team Meetings — Fri Nov 13, 4:00 PM — Asian American and Asian Resource and Cultural Center [Purdue]
Fri Nov 13: AAARCC Language & Conversation Practice — Fri Nov 13, 3:00 PM — Asian American and Asian Resource and Cultural Center [Purdue]
Fri Nov 13: AI and Collective Decision Making Conference — Fri Nov 13, 8:30 AM — Stewart Center [Purdue]
Fri Nov 13: CALC Colloquium: Digital Interventions for Aging and Disability — Fri Nov 13, 12:30 PM — Stewart Center [Purdue]
Fri Nov 13: Center for Working Well Fall Research Awards Presentation — Fri Nov 13, 9:00 AM — Jerry S. Rawls Hall [Purdue]
Fri Nov 13: CLA Grad Student Symposium — Fri Nov 13, 9:00 AM — STEW 279 [Purdue]
Fri Nov 13: Decide on Daniels - November Grad Visit Day — Fri Nov 13, 9:00 AM — Jerry S. Rawls Hall [Purdue]
Fri Nov 13: Field of Flags — Fri Nov 13, 12:00 AM — Purdue Memorial Union [Purdue]
Fri Nov 13: Pride & Prejudice — Fri Nov 13, 7:30 PM — Yue-Kong Pao Hall of Visual & Perf Arts [Purdue]
Fri Nov 13: Purdue Bands & Orchestras Presents Jazz Bands — Fri Nov 13, 7:00 PM — Loeb Playhouse - Stewart Center [Purdue]
Fri Nov 13: Toastmasters at Purdue | Weekly Meetup — Fri Nov 13, 12:00 PM — 2501 Wang Hall Via Zoom [Purdue]
Sat Nov 14: Pride & Prejudice — Sat Nov 14, 7:30 PM — Yue-Kong Pao Hall of Visual & Perf Arts [Purdue]
Sat Nov 14: Purdue Bands & Orchestras Presents Concert Band & Wind Ensemble — Sat Nov 14, 7:00 PM — Long Center for the Performing Arts [Purdue]
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Hi Iniyan,
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Purdue News Weekly · 1 issue
A presidential welcome, homecoming highlights and championship hopes — Fri, Nov 13
FEATURED STORIES
Photo gallery: President-elect Silveria greets the Boilermaker community
Retired Lt. Gen. Jay B. Silveria wasted no time in getting out to meet members of the Purdue community. After being introduced as president-elect Nov. 5, he spent the next few days introducing himself to students, alumni, faculty and staff from all corners of campus. View these highlights from Silveria’s busy homecoming weekend.
Photo gallery: Purdue Homecoming 2026
Boilermakers gathered in West Lafayette on Nov. 5-8 for Purdue’s homecoming, celebrating the traditions, friendships and memories that connect generations of Purdue alumni, students and fans. The weekend’s festivities included the homecoming parade, Boilermaker Boulevard and Saturday’s football game. Take a look back at some of our favorite moments from Homecoming 2026.
Advancing nuclear construction technologies: The Purdue Applied Research Institute is partnering with the U.S. Department of Energy to test new approaches to nuclear construction.
Purdue researchers will design and build model structures that can house nuclear reactors, helping demonstrate methods that could reduce construction costs and timelines while building workforce and supply chain capabilities for the nuclear construction industry.
‘5 Questions With the Provost’: In the next episode of the video series “5 Questions With the Provost,” Provost Patrick Wolfe talks with Jim Bullard, the Dr. Samuel R. Allen Dean of the Mitch Daniels School of Business, about Purdue’s competitive advantage in attracting the best and brightest students, how our STEM strengths are helping prepare the next generation of business leaders, and the implications of AI on global financial markets.
Rerouting truckloads of excess food from landfills to food pantries: Alex Psomas uses computer science to address real-world problems, including food shortages. His novel program uses tools including machine learning and flexible algorithms to help truck drivers deliver food where it can do the most good. He has worked with food banks in Indiana and Ohio, diverting more than 50 tons of food from landfills to food pantries so far.
STUDENT LIFE
Photo gallery: How Boiler Bee Honey makes its way from hive to bottle
Each summer, Purdue’s honey bee colonies reward a season of work and research with a bounty of honey. Students and staff gather surplus honey from the research colonies, transport the frames to an off-site extraction facility, and process and bottle the harvest as Boiler Bee Honey.
BOILERMAKER STORIES
Why Beth Stubbings joined the Purdue 1 crew
Having already traveled to space six times, Beth Stubbings wasn’t searching for a chance to go there again. But when she learned about an opportunity to join the Purdue 1 suborbital mission, the aeronautical and astronautical engineering alum immediately recognized how her extensive experience could be useful to her alma mater. She’ll also contribute to research for the Weldon School of Biomedical Engineering.
SPORTS
Purdue soccer to host Spartans today in Big Ten Tournament championship
Purdue soccer will host Michigan State in the Big Ten Tournament championship match at 6 p.m. today (Nov. 13) at Folk Field. It marks the Boilermakers’ second appearance in the championship and their first since 2007. The sold-out match will be televised on Big Ten Network.
GET READY
Purdue Theatre debuts ‘Pride and Prejudice’
Life was pleasantly drab for Elizabeth Bennet until the haughty (though admittedly handsome) Mr. Darcy barged in on her life. Now she’s caught in a dilemma: Can Elizabeth be true to her feelings while also standing up to Darcy’s arrogance? Purdue Theatre’s lively adaptation of Jane Austen’s beloved novel persuades us that even the worst first impressions can be overcome. Catch the production today (Nov. 13) through Nov. 22 at the Nancy T. Hansen Theatre in Pao Hall.
Nurse Blake returns with new comedy tour, ‘But Did You Die?’
Circus arts company Gravity & Other Myths presents ‘Ten Thousand Hours’
International Education Week: Purdue will celebrate International Education Week
(IEW) with faculty, staff and students encouraged to take part in planned events across campus Sunday through Saturday, Nov. 15-21. Begun as a joint initiative of the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Department of Education, IEW is an annual event highlighting the benefits of international education and exchange worldwide through global innovation, collaborative research and education.
BOILER CROSSWORD
Stay connected with campus news in a whole new way. Challenge your memory with a fresh crossword puzzle built entirely around the latest Purdue headlines.
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send mail ONLY to cs · 4 issues
cs daily Subj-class mailing 20000 51 — Mon, Nov 9
arXiv:2611.09060
Date: Fri, 6 Nov 2026 06:36:31 GMT (201kb)
Title: Fair Selection of Generalized Nash Equilibria: A Comparability
Perspective
Authors: Sophie Hall, Heinrich H. Nax, Saverio Bolognani
Categories: cs.GT cs.SY eess.SY math.OC
Comments: Book chapter, 25 pages, 4 figures. To appear in Socio-Inspired and
Socially Aware Control for Complex Systems, Springer
\\
Generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) problems model self-interested agents
coupled through their costs and shared constraints, and arise throughout
control applications that allocate a scarce common resource. Such problems
typically admit a continuum of equilibria, so any implementation must
\emph{select} one. This selection is not neutral: it decides how the cost of
the shared constraint is distributed among the agents, a decision often
expected to be fair. The variational GNE (v-GNE), which charges all agents a
uniform shadow price, is the conventional choice and is frequently advocated as
fair. Through the lens of \emph{comparability} from social choice theory, we
show that the GNE set itself requires no inter-agent comparability of costs,
whereas the v-GNE implicitly assumes cardinal unit comparability, one of the
stronger notions. We then introduce the fair GNE (f-GNE), which selects an
equilibrium by explicitly optimizing a fairness metric matched to the
comparability at hand, and give constructive routes to compute it for
single-constraint and linear-quadratic games. An electric-vehicle charging game
serves as a running example throughout this self-contained tutorial.
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.09060 , 201kb)
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\\
arXiv:2611.09244
Date: Fri, 6 Nov 2026 10:06:52 GMT (98kb)
Title: Attaining Optimal Values under Sure Constraints
Authors: Takuto Yamauchi (1 and 2), Kenji Tei (2) ((1) Waseda University, (2)
Institute of Science Tokyo)
Categories: cs.GT cs.LO
Comments: 61 pages, 6 figures. Complete proofs included. Corresponding author:
Takuto Yamauchi
\\
A game may have, for each target below its value, a finite controller meeting
that target, yet no finite controller attaining the value itself. We study
finite stochastic games with a hard specification that must hold on every
supported execution, including paths of probability zero. Max uses a pure
finite controller; Min may use any pure public-history strategy. We distinguish
three numerical questions: can a supplied target be met, can the unspecified
optimum be attained, and what is one exact value? For explicit hard and Boolean
soft Streett conditions, the strict and non-strict supplied-threshold problems
are coNP-complete, attainment of the unsupplied supremum is $\mathrm
P^{\mathrm{NP}}$-complete, and one exact reduced fraction is
$\mathrm{FP}^{\mathrm{NP}}$-complete under polynomial metric reductions. The
proofs preserve both the value and its finite attainability when fixing a
single opponent, and encode adaptive queries without computing unknown subgame
values. The same construction yields matching value-comparison and exact-output
lower bounds for ordinary stochastic Streett games with unrestricted randomized
history strategies. We also bound the memory needed for optimal finite
implementations for arbitrary Muller hard conditions and rational rewards in
$[0,1]$ determined by infinitely recurring states. One controller is sure from
the entire original sure region and attains at every finitely attained start,
with no attainment premise on the other states. For $n$ states in that region
it uses $2^{O(n\log(n+1))}Q(1+\log R)$ modes, where $Q$ is the product of the
least common denominators of full original chance rows sourced in that sure
region and $R$ clears all reward values. Its joint dependence on $Q$ and $R$ is
worst-case sharp at each fixed $n\ge6$ when $Q,R\ge2$. Optimal dependence on
arena size and efficient general synthesis are not resolved here.
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.09244 , 98kb)
——————————————————————————
\\
arXiv:2611.09558
Date: Fri, 6 Nov 2026 15:02:17 GMT (55kb)
Title: Optimal Regret for Profit Maximization in Bilateral Trade
Authors: Matteo Castiglioni, Anna Lunghi, Alberto Marchesi
Categories: cs.GT cs.LG
\\
Learning to profit from trade requires learning both sides of a market: what
a seller is willing to accept and what a buyer is willing to pay. We study
repeated bilateral trade, where an intermediary posts a purchase price to a
seller and a sale price to a buyer whose valuations are drawn from an unknown
joint distribution. Trade occurs only if both parties accept their respective
prices, in which case the intermediary earns the difference between the two
prices. The intermediary observes only whether trade occurs, without observing
either valuation. We show that learning both sides of the market is no harder,
in terms of regret, than learning just one. Specifically, we design an
algorithm achieving regret $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(T^{2/3})$ against the best
fixed pair of prices, matching, up to logarithmic factors, the classical lower
bound for one-dimensional dynamic pricing. Our result shows that the classical
one-dimensional regret rate survives the transition to two dimensions, raising
the question of whether this absence of a curse of dimensionality extends to
arbitrarily high dimensions.
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.09558 , 55kb)
——————————————————————————
\\
arXiv:2611.09615
Date: Fri, 6 Nov 2026 15:35:58 GMT (43kb)
Title: Contextual Search and Bilateral Trade with a Trace-Square-Root Potential
Authors: Romain Cosson and Federico Fusco and Anupam Gupta and Stefano Leonardi
and Renato Paes Leme and Matteo Russo
Categories: cs.GT cs.LG
\\
We present a unified potential method for contextual search and bilateral
trade with one-bit feedback and obtain order-tight algorithms for both
problems. Our framework starts from a Bayesian perspective in which the unknown
target (for contextual search) and the unknown pair of valuations (for
bilateral trade) are sampled from a known prior distribution. In that model,
the decision maker bases its prediction on the posterior distribution, obtained
by conditioning on feedback received in previous rounds.
For Bayesian contextual search, we present an algorithm with a total loss
bounded by $O(\mathrm{Tr} \sqrt \Sigma)$, where $\Sigma$ is the covariance
matrix of the target’s prior; and for contextual bilateral trade, our
algorithm’s regret is bounded by $O(\mathrm{Tr} \sqrt{\Sigma_S}+\mathrm{Tr}
\sqrt{\Sigma_B})$, where $\Sigma_S$ and $\Sigma_B$ are the covariance matrices
of the seller’s and buyer’s valuations.
We then use ideas from this Bayesian setting and adapt a ``dual’‘ of this
trace-square-root potential to the classical worst-case setting, where the
target and valuations are chosen adversarially from the unit Euclidean ball.
For both contextual search and bilateral trade, we obtain tight $O(\sqrt
d)$-regret algorithms. These results match the existing lower bounds up to a
constant factor and improve on the previous guarantees of $O(d\log d)$ for
contextual search and of $O(d6^d)$ for bilateral trade.
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.09615 , 43kb)
——————————————————————————
\\
arXiv:2611.09780
Date: Fri, 6 Nov 2026 17:42:24 GMT (439kb)
Title: Strategic Competition and Convergence in LLM Leaderboards
Authors: Naveen Raman, Fei Fang, Yiling Chen
Categories: cs.GT cs.CY cs.SE
\\
Leaderboards are a popular way to compare large language model (LLM)
capabilities and can influence how model developers invest resources. We ask
when competition on leaderboards leads developers to produce models with
similar capability profiles, which we call monoculture, or similar performance
levels. We study this by formulating leaderboard competition as a game in which
model developers invest resources across capabilities to maximize their win
rate. We show that similar production functions can induce similar capability
profiles, while comparative advantage can sustain distinct capability profiles.
We then study convergence in performance levels and show that diminishing
returns can lead to an increasingly crowded competitive frontier. Using data
from LM Arena and OpenRouter, we find that developers improve more in
categories where they lag competitors, while still retaining category-specific
advantages. At the same time, we find that the frontier of models becomes
increasingly crowded, alongside increasingly diversified model usage patterns.
Our results suggest that increasing competition does not need to produce
interchangeable models, but can instead sustain competitive models with
distinct strengths.
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.09780 , 439kb)
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——————————————————————————
\\
arXiv:2611.08673 (*cross-listing*)
Date: Thu, 5 Nov 2026 20:28:51 GMT (50kb)
Title: Optimal Contention Resolution from Samples
Authors: Shaddin Dughmi, Vasilis Livanos, Pranav Nuti
Categories: cs.DS cs.GT
\\
Contention resolution schemes convert random sets which are ex-ante feasible
for some constraint into sets which are feasible ex post, and their online
variants have broad applications in Bayesian and stochastic optimization,
including prophet inequalities and stochastic probing. In many such
applications, however, full distributional knowledge is an unattainable
requirement. This motivates the study of contention resolution schemes which
employ a limited number of samples from the underlying distributions.
We study sample-based contention resolution for $k$-uniform matroids, for
both uniformly random and adversarial arrival orders, and compare their balance
guarantees to the best possible with full distributional knowledge. For a
single-item constraint, we show that one sample per element suffices for an
optimal $(1-1/e)$-balanced ROCRS. For adversarial arrivals, however, we prove
that no single-sample OCRS can be $1/2$-balanced, even for known arrival
orders, separating contention resolution from prophet inequalities in the
single-sample setting. Perhaps surprisingly, we show that two samples are
necessary and sufficient for the optimal $1/2$ guarantee. We also present a
single-sample $0.48$-balanced scheme.
For general $k$, we give a simple single-sample ROCRS that achieves an
optimal balance ratio of $1-e^{-k}k^k/k!$. In adversarial order, we obtain a
single-sample $(1 - O(1/\sqrt{k}))$-balanced scheme, matching the optimal
asymptotic dependence on $k$.
Finally, we complete the picture by characterizing the minimum number of
samples needed to match the optimal balance ratio achievable with full
distributional knowledge. For random arrivals, one sample suffices for $k =
1,2,3,4$, and zero samples suffice for $k \geq 5$. For an adversarial arrival
order, even known in advance, and any $k \geq 2$, we show that no constant
number of samples suffices to achieve optimal balance.
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.08673 , 50kb)
——————————————————————————
\\
arXiv:2611.08869 (*cross-listing*)
Date: Fri, 6 Nov 2026 01:52:54 GMT (158kb)
Title: As Easy as Rank One: Optimal Algorithms for Matroid Secretary and
Single-Sample Matroid Prophet
Authors: Hamed Abdi, Kiarash Banihashem, MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi, Zhiyi Huang,
Danny Mittal, Sahil Singla
Categories: cs.DS cs.GT
Comments: This paper merges and extends arXiv:2609.14555, arXiv:2609.19118, and
arXiv:2609.30421
\\
We resolve the matroid secretary conjecture in its strong form and the
single-sample matroid prophet inequality problem, achieving competitive ratios
$e$ and $2$, respectively. Both ratios are optimal, even for rank-one matroids.
For matroid secretary, our ordinal algorithm accepts the elements of the
canonical optimum independently, each with probability $1/e$. It needs only the
number of elements in advance and uses an expected polynomial number of
independence queries on arrived elements. For single-sample matroid prophet
inequalities, our algorithm uses one sample per independent value distribution
and $O(n^2)$ independence queries on a known $n$-element matroid. It works for
every arrival order fixed independently of the samples, values, and algorithmic
randomness. The selected elements and their values have exactly the joint
distribution obtained by independently retaining each element–value pair in
the canonical optimum of a fresh product draw with probability $1/2$.
Our main algorithms maintain a reference state whose greedy solution contains
every accepted element. Its updates, made even after rejections, preserve exact
distributional invariants. A short reversible-update argument gives a
$4$-probability-competitive secretary algorithm, already resolving the original
conjecture; a related invariant gives the optimal single-sample prophet
inequality. For secretary, we characterize the distributions achievable by
ordinal algorithms through a finite polytope. A continuous-time formulation
then lets us design an accepted-set distribution achieving the optimal ratio
$e$ and realize it efficiently. We also obtain guarantees for matroid
intersections.
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.08869 , 158kb)
——————————————————————————
\\
arXiv:2611.09331 (*cross-listing*)
Date: Fri, 6 Nov 2026 11:26:32 GMT (407kb)
Title: An Inspection Game for Monitor Design Against GNSS Timing Attacks in
Synchronous Islanding
Authors: Gregory Provan and Quanyan Zhu
Categories: eess.SY cs.GT cs.SY
\\
Phasor measurement units (PMUs) take their time from GNSS, so a spoofer that
slowly drags a receiver clock rotates the reported phase without touching the
power waveform. The threat is acute in synchronous islanding, where a
controller keeps an islanded generator in phase with the grid, using one PMU on
each side of an open breaker, so that the two can be reconnected at any moment:
a differential clock bias of about $0.56$\,ms can make the controller hold the
generator $10^\circ$ out of phase while it reports perfect synchronism. We cast
the defense as a zero-sum inspection game. The defender, as inspector, chooses
its timing monitors and audits the clocks periodically; the attacker, as
inspectee, drags the two clocks to an unsafe bias by the next audit; the payoff
is the evidence, the Kullback–Leibler divergence between the probability laws
of the defender’s record under attack and under normal operation. Our central
result is that the evidence equals the cost of the cheapest innocent
explanation of the attacked record. This single identity predicts which
monitors work, turns the attacker’s best response into a strictly convex
quadratic program, and turns the defender’s design into a convex program with a
saddle point. Pairing explanations, which bound the evidence from above, with
test statistics, which bound it from below, certifies audit periods in which
every successful attack leaves at least a threshold of evidence. On a 50\,Hz
island, these evidence-based periods, at the matched-test threshold, are up to
8.4 times as long as those of a rule that checks each monitor separately, and
the case study favors placing the better oscillator on the utility side of the
breaker.
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.09331 , 407kb)
——————————————————————————
\\
arXiv:2611.09399 (*cross-listing*)
Date: Fri, 6 Nov 2026 12:34:40 GMT (7450kb)
Title: Artificial Shoppers and Attention Competition
Authors: Xiaomeng Guo, Fasheng Xu, Xiaoli Zhang
Categories: econ.TH cs.AI cs.GT
\\
We study how AI shopping interfaces affect price competition, platform
profit, and consumer welfare. A platform hosts two of three products of
different quality. Without AI, consumers compare the hosted pair under salience
distortion and overweight whichever attribute, price or quality, stands out.
Under assistance, an AI assistant recommends the two products with the highest
true utility, leaving consumers to make the same distorted comparison. Under
delegation, an AI agent selects the best product, subject to purchase approval.
Both modes access all products and know consumers’ preferences; firms price
strategically. First, assistance can soften competition despite expanded
product access. The middle-quality firm may forgo low-valuation consumers
because attracting them requires cutting the price paid by higher-valuation
consumers as well. Relative to no AI with the same assortment, assistance
lowers both hosted prices under the high- and low-quality pair but can raise
both under the high- and middle-quality pair. Second, we identify an alignment
paradox: some consumers can become worse off than without AI even though their
best option remains recommended and becomes cheaper. Salience can induce a
switch to a lower-quality product whose quality loss exceeds the saving
relative to the original purchase. The assistant ranks products accurately but
does not optimize the shortlist for consumers’ realized welfare. Third,
assistance can raise both platform profit and aggregate consumer surplus with
the high- and middle-quality pair; delegation can do so with the high- and
low-quality pair. Fourth, among AI designs, the platform weakly prefers
delegation with the high- and middle-quality pair wherever all compared pricing
equilibria exist. Yet this preferred design can yield lower platform profit and
aggregate consumer surplus than the no-AI optimum.
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.09399 , 7450kb)
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\\
arXiv:2506.14544
replaced with revised version Fri, 6 Nov 2026 10:25:42 GMT (65kb)
Title: Infinite lexicographic products of positional objectives
Authors: Antonio Casares, Pierre Ohlmann, Micha{\l} Skrzypczak, Igor
Walukiewicz
Categories: cs.GT
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.14544 , 65kb)
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arXiv:2606.30118
replaced with revised version Fri, 6 Nov 2026 12:29:17 GMT (99kb)
Title: Effective Horizons for Prophet Inequalities with Discounted I.I.D.
Rewards
Authors: Jung-hun Kim, Vianney Perchet
Categories: cs.GT cs.DM cs.DS econ.TH math.OC
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.30118 , 99kb)
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arXiv:2607.09993
replaced with revised version Thu, 5 Nov 2026 22:15:32 GMT (10456kb)
Title: Beyond Bayesian Nash: Learning Minimax-Regret Equilibria for Adversarial
Team Games under Asymmetric Information
Authors: Naman Aggarwal, Jonathan P. How
Categories: cs.GT cs.AI cs.LG cs.MA
Comments: 53 pages, 25 figures, 9 tables. Under review at Transactions on
Machine Learning Research (TMLR)
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.09993 , 10456kb)
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arXiv:2611.02984 (*cross-listing*)
replaced with revised version Fri, 6 Nov 2026 08:53:55 GMT (43kb)
Title: Classification Aggregation with Multiple Memberships
Authors: Federico Fioravanti, Leo Kurata, Vasilis Stamatis
Categories: econ.TH cs.GT cs.MA
Comments: 33 pages
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.02984 , 43kb)
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arXiv:2611.06891
replaced with revised version Fri, 6 Nov 2026 12:26:08 GMT (50kb)
Title: Prophet Secretary for Matroids and XOS Valuations: A Separation at 1-1/e
and a 0.6767 Guarantee for I.I.D. Weights
Authors: Hossein Esfandiari, MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi
Categories: cs.DS cs.GT
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.06891 , 50kb)
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cs daily Subj-class mailing 20000 51 — Tue, Nov 10
arXiv:2611.10229
Date: Fri, 6 Nov 2026 21:17:54 GMT (3448kb)
Title: Proportionality in Elections under Feasibility Constraints and Ranked
Ballots: The Solid Coalition Refinement Rule
Authors: Grzegorz Kwacz, Georgios Papasotiropoulos, Piotr Skowron
Categories: cs.GT
\\
We study elections with ranked ballots and general feasibility constraints,
which indicate which sets of candidates are allowed as outcomes. We introduce
the first proportionality axiom for this general setting and show that it
extends the established notions from specific models that fit our general
framework. We extend the Solid Coalition Refinement (SCR) rule to general
constraints and prove that it satisfies our axiom exactly for matroid
constraints. Although the naive implementation of SCR involves a step that is
computationally intractable for weak orders, we show that in practical cases it
can be implemented in polynomial time or efficiently in FPT time. We also
illustrate limitations of this rule for approval ballots and provide its first
empirical evaluation.
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.10229 , 3448kb)
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arXiv:2611.10294
Date: Fri, 6 Nov 2026 22:44:28 GMT (62kb)
Title: Robust Analysis of First-Price Auctions with Large Supply
Authors: Jason Hartline, Anant Shah, Matthew vonAllmen
Categories: cs.GT
\\
This paper performs a robust analysis of welfare (i.e., the price of anarchy)
in multi-unit first-price auctions with independent private values and
unit-demand bidders. We employ a smoothness framework (see \citealp{ST-13}) to
analyze the price of anarchy when supply is large.
The main barrier to analysis in this framework is a worst-case bid
distribution that establishes a lower bound on the price of anarchy of $1-
\frac{1}{e}$. We show that such worst-case distributions cannot arise in
equilibrium when agents’ values satisfy a mild density lower bound condition.
This characterization leads to novel asymptotic lower bounds. In particular,
the price of anarchy for $\epsilon$-approximate equilibrium as the number of
units goes to infinity is at least $1-\Theta \left(\epsilon \log
\left(\frac{1}{\epsilon}\right)\right)$.
Our analysis relies on a key structural property of equilibrium bid
distributions: for a welfare analysis in any multi-unit first-price auction, it
is without loss to analyze (approximate) equilibria with no atoms. In addition
to this, we establish continuity and monotonicity properties of Bayes-Nash
equilibria. We believe these results are of independent interest.
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.10294 , 62kb)
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arXiv:2611.10345
Date: Sat, 7 Nov 2026 00:26:31 GMT (94kb)
Title: The Power of Two Choices in Dynamic Pricing: As Good As Full Feedback,
Instance-Wise
Authors: Yan Dai, Tao Lin, Aleksandrs Slivkins
Categories: cs.GT cs.LG
\\
We study the dynamic pricing problem, where a firm sells a product to $T$
myopic customers and their values are independent samples from an unknown value
distribution $F$. With posted prices, the firm only sees whether each customer
buys, and the minimax regret is $\widetilde \Theta(T^{2/3})$ [KL03]. A menu
instead offers several options, each selling the product with some probability
at some expected payment. Infinitely many menu options allow the seller to
fully reveal customer values, reducing the regret to $\Theta(\sqrt T)$. How
many options are needed?
Perhaps surprisingly, a second menu option suffices, achieving the same
regret as infinite menus (up to $\log$ factors). This holds broadly: without
knowing any property of $F$, our algorithm with two menu options attains
$\tilde O(\sqrt T)$ regret in general, $\tilde O(T^{1/3})$ regret for
monotone-hazard-rate distributions, and $\tilde O(T^{d/(d+1)})$
instance-dependent regret when $d\in(0,1)$ is a suitable notion of “dimension”.
All are optimal even with infinite menus. Moreover, we argue, via a novel
lower-bound construction, that our algorithm is near-optimal for each problem
instance.
Along the way, we study the query complexity of revenue maximization, where
an algorithm issues a query to each customer to learn the property of interest
(either the best price or the CDF) up to some precision. We show that interval
queries suffice to achieve the same query complexity as value queries (up to
$\log$ factors) for both properties and across several classes of value
distributions. We provide a new interval-query algorithm for each property. The
best-price-estimation algorithm is the key ingredient in our main dynamic
pricing algorithm, and the CDF-estimation algorithm underpins a simpler
algorithm attaining $\tilde O(\sqrt T)$ regret with three menu options.
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.10345 , 94kb)
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arXiv:2611.10558
Date: Sat, 7 Nov 2026 07:58:18 GMT (77kb)
Title: A Cooperative Game Theoretic Model for Sustainable, Smallholder Carbon
Farming
Authors: Geetha Charan, Thandava Sunkara, Rohit P Suresh, V. Priyanka,
Manojkumar Patil, Kodur Sai Vinay Sathvik, Y. Narahari
Categories: cs.GT
\\
Carbon farming offers a promising path to improve farmer livelihoods,
mitigate climate change, and make farming sustainable. However, smallholder
farmers, who dominate agriculture in developing economies, face structural
barriers to participating in carbon farming due to high certification costs,
limited landholdings, and limited budgets available to them. In this paper, we
develop a cooperative game-theoretic framework to study how coalition formation
can enable viable and profitable participation of smallholder farmers in carbon
farming. Our approach explores three components: (i) Solo Portfolio
Optimization (SPO), which determines an optimal portfolio of carbon farming
practices that individual farmers can adopt under budget constraints; (ii)
Joint Portfolio Optimization (JPO), which computes the maximum total economic
surplus achievable through the formation of farmer coalitions; and (iii)
surplus allocation among participating farmers in a principled way using
cooperative game-theoretic solution concepts, such as Shapley value, core,
least core, and nucleolus. We show that the underlying cooperative game is
superadditive under an affordability condition and non-convex in general. As
part of this study, we release CarbonFARM-Bench, a carbon farming dataset
constructed by experts, and conduct controlled computational experiments on
this dataset. We observe that solo participation in carbon farming is largely
infeasible for smallholder farmers under baseline parameters, whereas coalition
formation creates substantial value driven by economies of scale. In addition,
we demonstrate that stability-aware allocation mechanisms are required for
sustaining cooperation. Together, our results highlight that enabling
smallholder carbon farming is fundamentally a challenge of institutional
design, and we offer several policy recommendations to make it attractive to
smallholder farmers.
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.10558 , 77kb)
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arXiv:2611.10619
Date: Sat, 7 Nov 2026 09:49:22 GMT (42kb)
Title: On the Convergence of First-Order Methods in Signaling Games
Authors: Rilind Sahitaj, Artem Tsikiridis, Martin Bichler
Categories: cs.GT
Comments: Accepted at NeurIPS 2026
\\
We study first-order learning dynamics in Bayesian signaling games, a minimal
extensive-form model of strategic interaction under asymmetric information. In
these games, a Sender observes a private type and chooses a signal, after which
a Receiver forms a posterior belief and selects an action. This Bayesian belief
update makes the induced learning field fundamentally different from the affine
game-gradient fields of normal-form games. Empirically, we find a sharp
dichotomy: standard online learning algorithms reliably converge to strict
Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (PE), but not to non-strict ones. We show that this
behavior cannot be explained by the global geometric conditions commonly used
to prove last-iterate convergence, such as monotonicity or the Minty
variational inequality. Indeed, these conditions can fail even in binary
signaling games. Instead, we identify the relevant local geometry. Our main
result characterizes variational stability in finite signaling games: a PE is
variationally stable if and only if it is strict. This yields local
last-iterate convergence guarantees for online mirror descent and regularized
dual averaging near every strict PE. We then study global average-iterate
convergence and identify a class of signaling games in which coarse-trigger
regret-minimizing dynamics converge to the unique PE. Finally, we complement
the theory with experiments comparing projected gradient ascent, mirror-based
methods, optimistic variants, and PPO across canonical signaling-game families.
The results position signaling games as a compact testbed for understanding how
Bayesian belief formation reshapes the convergence geometry of multi-agent
learning.
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.10619 , 42kb)
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arXiv:2611.10791
Date: Sat, 7 Nov 2026 15:15:37 GMT (1700kb)
Title: Winning Reviews, Losing Discovery? The Co-Evolutionary Game of AI
Research and Peer Review
Authors: Hongze Liu, Mengru Wang, Zhiyuan Zhang, Yao Liu
Categories: cs.GT econ.GN q-fin.EC
\\
Autonomous research systems can produce convincing manuscripts whose
scientific value is difficult to verify, while automated reviewers can reward
the appearance of completeness. We examine how this gap can become a
self-reinforcing threat to the research community. In a two-population
evolutionary game, authors choose between acceptance-oriented and exploratory
research, and reviewers choose between proxy evaluation and careful assessment.
Cheaper acceptance-oriented production can increase review pressure, making
proxy assessment more attractive; proxy assessment can in turn strengthen the
incentive to produce reviewer-compatible work. We derive conditions under which
this feedback sustains a stable regime that rewards publication success while
reducing the scientific value of accepted work. An analytical basin boundary
explains why the same institutional rules can support either this regime or
exploratory research with careful review. Numerical illustrations show how
publication counts can conceal scientific loss, how faster adjustment can
reinforce existing practices, and why partial reform may fail once the cycle is
established. Careful audits and reviewer rewards can reverse the feedback,
while temporary support can produce lasting recovery if it moves the community
across the basin boundary. The model identifies a warning mechanism rather than
forecasting a particular conference: a review system can remain operational and
privately rewarding while becoming less effective at supporting discovery. Its
institutional implication is to reward independently validated contributions
and consequential checking, rather than accelerate paper production and scoring
alone.
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.10791 , 1700kb)
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arXiv:2611.11228
Date: Sun, 8 Nov 2026 08:22:09 GMT (116kb)
Title: Welfare in Envy-free Contracts: When Agents Have Sparse Interests
Authors: Junjie Chen, Cong Chen, Takuro Yamashita
Categories: cs.GT
\\
We study welfare maximization under envy-free contracts, where a principal
assigns tasks and offers success-contingent payments to heterogeneous agents
with hidden effort. For unit-demand agents, we establish a sharp complexity
boundary: the problem is polynomial-time solvable when each agent is interested
in at most two tasks, but NP-hard with at most three interests. Our algorithm
analyzes tree-structured dependencies among forced assignments and reduces
optimization to maximum-weight independent set in a perfect graph. When agents
may receive multiple tasks, no polynomial-time constant-factor approximation
exists unless $\mathrm{P}=\mathrm{NP}$. Finally, with homogeneous success
probabilities and rewards, we establish a welfare- and revenue-preserving
equivalence between unit-demand contract design and envy-free pricing. This
yields polynomial-time welfare maximization without restricting interests,
while revenue maximization remains NP-hard.
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.11228 , 116kb)
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arXiv:2611.11424
Date: Sun, 8 Nov 2026 14:36:52 GMT (96kb)
Title: The Query Complexity of Envy-Free Division: Cake, Chores, and Mixed
Resources
Authors: Alireza Farhadi and Mohammadtaghi Hajiaghayi
Categories: cs.GT
\\
We study the query complexity of envy-free division for cake, chores, and
resources with both positive and negative values. For arbitrary nonnegative
nonatomic chore costs, we give a deterministic exact protocol using
$2^{3n\log_2 n+O(n)}$ queries and cuts. For both cake and chores, a Las Vegas
protocol uses $O(n^{21}\log^2(2n))$ expected queries and $O(n^{20}\log^2(2n))$
expected cuts. Conversely, every exact protocol with fixed positive success
probability requires $\Omega(n^2)$ expected queries in general, even with
arbitrarily many output cuts at no query cost. For mixed cake and chores, no
uniform finite expected-query bound exists even when every Cut returns the
leftmost root or every Cut returns the rightmost root. This holds for any fixed
positive multiplicative approximation factor and success probability, already
when all net totals are one. An additive impossibility holds on the same
normalized domain.
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.11424 , 96kb)
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arXiv:2611.11556
Date: Sun, 8 Nov 2026 18:59:17 GMT (75kb)
Title: The Complexity of Computing a Competitive Equilibrium in Fisher Markets
with Chores
Authors: Christian Kroer, Ruta Mehta, Tianlong Nan
Categories: cs.GT
\\
We study the complexity of computing competitive equilibria in Fisher markets
with divisible chores and positive rational disutility coefficients and earning
requirements. For linear disutilities, we prove that exact equilibrium
computation is CLS-complete. In particular, the problem remains CLS-hard even
when the earning requirements are binary in $1$ and $2^k$, where $k$ is an
integer. We prove hardness by encoding the first-order conditions of a
box-constrained quadratic program in equilibrium prices and earning flows,
using a compact minimum-cost flow construction. For convex
constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) disutilities, exact equilibrium
prices may be irrational. We formulate the problem of finite-precision
equilibrium price computation, in which we seek rational prices with a
certified market clearing error at most a given rational tolerance encoded in
binary. We prove that this problem is CLS-complete for every fixed rational
exponent $\rho>1$. To prove this hardness, we encode a quartic polynomial
through the fourth-order expansion of the CES price potential function
corresponding to the Eisenberg-Gale (EG) dual program, and show that every
sufficiently accurate approximate equilibrium of the constructed market lies
near uniform prices. Additionally, we also identify a tractable special case of
chores Fisher markets. In particular, we provide a strongly polynomial
algorithm for exact equilibrium computation in linear markets whose disutility
matrix has rank at most two and earning requirements are arbitrary positive
rationals. For $n$ agents and $m$ chores, the algorithm uses $O(nm(n+m))$
rational arithmetic operations and comparisons, with polynomial intermediate
encoding length.
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.11556 , 75kb)
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arXiv:2611.11693
Date: Sun, 8 Nov 2026 23:28:16 GMT (33kb)
Title: Homological Barriers to Stable Learning of First-Order Nash Equilibria
Authors: Ashkan Soleymani, Gabriele Farina, Patrick Jaillet, Georgios Piliouras
Categories: cs.GT cs.LG
Comments: The Fortieth Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing
Systems (NeurIPS) 2026
\\
We identify a homological barrier to stable learning of local Nash
equilibria, also known as first-order Nash equilibria (FONE), in constrained
non-concave differentiable games. We consider continuous deterministic learning
dynamics that fix every FONE point and aim to attract all initial conditions to
the full FONE set. We show that this convergence guarantee is impossible when
the target set has nontrivial positive-degree cohomology, such as that arising
from a loop, and the state space is compact and contractible. We exhibit this
barrier in a simple non-concave quadratic zero-sum game on a box whose exact
FONE set consists of a diagonal six-edge loop and an isolated point.
Consequently, no such dynamics can make the full FONE set a stable global
attractor. We further show that degree two is the minimal polynomial degree at
which this barrier can arise and extend the construction to obtain nontrivial
homology in arbitrarily high degrees. Finally, we establish that the barrier
persists for sufficiently small approximate-FONE targets under small
perturbations, yielding an open, positive-volume family of quadratic zero-sum
games with the same homological barrier.
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.11693 , 33kb)
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arXiv:2611.12611
Date: Mon, 9 Nov 2026 15:52:03 GMT (355kb)
Title: Learning Global Equilibria in Non-Concave Prospect Theoretic Games
Authors: Ashok Krishnan K.S., Lilou Malfoy, Helene Le Cadre, Ana Busic
Categories: cs.GT
\\
Human agents in non cooperative games often exhibit non rational behaviour.
Prospect theory provides a behavioural framework to capture how agents perceive
gains and losses under risk, but, its incorporation into games typically leads
to non concave and non convex utility functions, making equilibrium computation
challenging. In such cases, it is difficult to obtain algorithms that have
global convergence behaviour. This paper proposes a learning algorithm which
uses minorization-maximization (MM). Under a proximal Polyak-Lojasiewicz (PL)
condition on the potential function, we establish global convergence of the
algorithm to a potential-maximizing Nash equilibrium. We further show how the
structure of the MM minorizer can be used to enable a distributed
implementation of the algorithm. With additional noise injection, the
individual updates of the agents can be obscured, while still ensuring global
convergence.
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.12611 , 355kb)
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arXiv:2611.12740
Date: Mon, 9 Nov 2026 17:22:43 GMT (22kb)
Title: Computing EF1 Allocations under Budget Constraints in Polynomial Time
Authors: Tingwei Hu, Lili Mei, Guochuan Zhang
Categories: cs.GT cs.DS
\\
We study the fair allocation of indivisible items to agents with budget
constraints and additive valuations. Each agent compares its own bundle with
the subsets of another bundle that fit its budget. An allocation is envy-free
up to one item (EF1) if, for every agent and every nonempty subset under
comparison, removing an item of maximum value to that agent eliminates its
envy. We require EF1 both between agents and towards the charity, which
contains all unallocated items. EF1 allocations exist, but computing them in
polynomial time has remained open even for homogeneous valuations. We resolve
this problem with a polynomial-time algorithm for EF1 allocations under
heterogeneous valuations. We also prove that detecting an EF1 violation is
NP-complete. Equivalently, checking whether a given allocation is EF1 is
coNP-complete. Finally, we give polynomial-time algorithms for envy-freeness up
to any item (EFX) both when each agent’s valuation is proportional to item size
and when each agent has a fixed number of distinct positive item values. As an
application, for homogeneous valuations and any $\varepsilon>0$, we obtain an
EF1 allocation with at least a $(1/2-\varepsilon)$ fraction of the maximum
social welfare in time polynomial in the input length and $1/\varepsilon$.
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.12740 , 22kb)
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arXiv:2604.02285 (*cross-listing*)
Date: Thu, 2 Apr 2026 17:26:44 GMT (7582kb)
Date (revised v2): Wed, 4 Nov 2026 10:56:03 GMT (2178kb)
Title: The Computational Complexity of Avoiding Strict Saddle Points in
Constrained Optimization
Authors: Andreas Kontogiannis and Ioannis Panageas and Vasilis Pollatos
Categories: cs.CC cs.DS cs.GT math.OC
Comments: This version simplifies the group analysis and extends the results to
the SOSP2 definition and nonconvex games. The abstract was shortened to meet
the arXiv requirements
\\
The complexity of finding second-order stationary points (SOSPs) in
constrained settings has remained unclear and has been highlighted as an open
question by the works of Hollender and Zampetakis [2023] and Kontogiannis et
al. [2024]. In particular, under one established definition (SOSP1) where
nonnegative curvature is required only along the null space of the active
constraints [Bertsekas, 1997], the problem lies in TFNP, and algorithms with
$O(poly(1/\epsilon))$ running times have been proposed. Under another
established notion of stationarity (SOSP2) checking is coNP-hard in high
dimensions.
We investigate the computational landscape of finding SOSPs under polytope
constraints. We prove that, even if promised that all KKT points lie a constant
distance away from the domain’s boundary–where SOSP1 and SOSP2 reduce to the
standard unconstrained conditions–finding an approximate SOSP under either
definition is PLS-hard, and the hardness continues to hold even in $[0,1]^2$.
As a direct consequence, our result establishes a fundamental barrier on the
continuity of SOSP-computing algorithms: unless PLS=CLS, no deterministic,
iterative algorithm with a computationally efficient, continuous update rule
can guarantee that every $\epsilon$-approximate fixed point is an
$(\epsilon,\sqrt{\epsilon})$-SOSP, even under the above interior promise.
We establish PLS-completeness by proving that the problem of finding
approximate SOSP1 belongs to PLS in high dimensions. In addition, we prove
that, for every fixed $d\ge 2$, finding an approximate SOSP2 is also
PLS-complete, escaping the coNP-hardness which appears in high dimensions.
We also establish PLS-hardness and a polynomial-time search reduction to
LOCALOPT for finding $(r^{2+\gamma},r)$-local pure Nash equilibria, for every
fixed rational $\gamma\in(0,1]$, in two-player nonconvex common-interest games
with actions in $[0,1]$.
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.02285 , 2178kb)
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arXiv:2611.10254 (*cross-listing*)
Date: Fri, 6 Nov 2026 21:44:22 GMT (44kb)
Title: FirstSwap: Pre-Consensus Trade Approvals for Decentralized Market Design
Authors: William Diamond, Fatima Elsheimy, Dahlia Malkhi, Geoff Ramseyer,
Srivatsan Sridhar
Categories: cs.DC cs.CR cs.GT
\\
Decentralized exchanges typically give traders no execution guarantee until a
block is finalized. In the meantime, external prices move, traders
strategically delay submission, and block producers can influence inclusion and
ordering. We introduce FirstSwap, a DEX built on a constant-function market
maker pricing curve that gives traders an early pre-approval before consensus,
guaranteeing inclusion and execution within their submitted price limit, with
final ordering determined by limit prices rather than by a block producer.
We demonstrate the benefits of trade pre-approvals in an economic model
combining auction theory with CEX-DEX arbitrage. When the CEX price changes
gradually, FirstSwap rewards earlier traders with better prices, discouraging
strategic delay and yielding higher social welfare and gains to AMM liquidity
providers than a batch auction. When the CEX price jumps abruptly, FirstSwap
yields higher welfare and smaller AMM losses than fair ordering.
The central challenge is delivering fast trade pre-approvals without
consensus. We introduce a decentralized, scaled admissibility protocol under
which each validator reserves only a fraction of the available liquidity at
every price. A trader obtains approval in a single round of messages with a
quorum of validators. Somewhat surprisingly, despite Byzantine validators who
may approve trades arbitrarily, we show that all quorum-certified trades are
jointly admissible and execute within their limits. Our protocol extends
naturally to a setting where buy and sell orders can be pre-approved against
each other before a block is finalized.
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.10254 , 44kb)
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arXiv:2611.10261 (*cross-listing*)
Date: Fri, 6 Nov 2026 21:50:21 GMT (167kb)
Title: Is Recursive Self-Improvement Safe?
Authors: Vincent Conitzer
Categories: cs.AI cs.GT cs.LG
Comments: To appear in IEEE Intelligent Systems
\\
The phrase recursive self-improvement (RSI) refers to the idea of an AI
system designing and creating another, better AI system, which in turn designs
and creates an even better one, and so on. While the idea has a long history,
it has always been an abstract, futuristic idea – until recently. Today’s
frontier AI has attained a set of abilities, including in programming,
mathematics, research, tool use, and working coherently over extended periods
of time, that make RSI seem plausible. AI companies are starting to pursue it,
but many of the involved people are also expressing concerns, asking whether
humanity should really set this in motion and under what conditions. I will
discuss the situation, argue that we do not even have clear frameworks for
thinking about the likely outcomes of RSI, and do a quick game-theoretic
analysis of how to choose whether to initiate RSI when another party is making
the same choice.
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.10261 , 167kb)
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arXiv:2611.10690 (*cross-listing*)
Date: Sat, 7 Nov 2026 12:21:25 GMT (14712kb)
Title: JoVox: Joint Hierarchical Flow Matching for Lightweight Voxel Generation
Authors: Xiangjun Tang, Jianqi Chen, Peter Wonka
Categories: cs.CV cs.GT
\\
Generating high-fidelity voxels while keeping their lightweight nature
remains an open problem in computer vision. Current generators are either
high-fidelity but computationally heavy, or lightweight but of lower fidelity.
Hierarchical methods keep the lightweight nature of voxels. However, their
coarse levels, which decide where all finer cells can appear, are generated
with the least information about the shape and are never revisited, so they are
often plausible but wrong. Our key insight is to let finer cells take part in
deciding coarse cells. To this end, we propose JoVox, a discrete flow matching
framework that learns the joint distribution of all levels of the voxel
hierarchy, instead of a separate distribution for each level, so that coarse
cells can be predicted with finer cells already generated nearby. Within this
framework, we further introduce a two-level prediction, which outputs the cells
two levels finer at once instead of one level finer, halving the number of
levels that the network processes and yielding voxels of higher fidelity. We
also introduce an unmasking strategy that revisits early decisions once finer
cells are generated and corrects inconsistencies in masked diffusion models.
Our framework outperforms the baselines on both unconditional and
image-conditioned voxel generation. Compared with the current state-of-the-art
TRELLIS.2, we achieve 8x higher training throughput, 1/15 of the FLOPs in a
forward pass, train on 4 vs. 32 GPUs, and obtain higher quality with an 11%
lower Chamfer distance.
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.10690 , 14712kb)
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arXiv:2611.11032 (*cross-listing*)
Date: Sun, 8 Nov 2026 00:18:10 GMT (34kb)
Title: Finite-Sample and Communication-Efficient Networked Information
Aggregation
Authors: Mohammadhossein Bateni, Zahra Hadizadeh, MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi,
Mahdi JafariRaviz, Shayan Taherijam
Categories: cs.LG cs.AI cs.GT
Comments: Accepted at the 40th Conference on Neural Information Processing
Systems (NeurIPS 2026)
\\
Building on SODA 2026 work Kearns et al. (2026), we study learning in
directed acyclic graphs in which each agent observes only a subset of the input
coordinates and may use the predictions of its parents as additional features.
In the finite-sample protocol, the message sent along each edge is the agent’s
prediction vector on a shared sample, so the communication cost is linear in
the sample size $m$. In this paper we study this model under communication
constraints.
First, we revisit the finite-sample analysis of the full-message protocol. We
identify a gap in the finite-sample proof of Kearns et al. (2026) and develop a
different argument that establishes a finite-sample population-risk guarantee
along paths satisfying deterministic $M$-coverage.
Second, we introduce a shared-sketch protocol in which each agent sends a
$k$-dimensional linear sketch of its prediction vector instead of the full
$m$-dimensional message, where $k\ll m$. We analyze this protocol through a
reduction to least squares on the compressed sample together with an oblivious
subspace embedding argument. The resulting bound separates statistics from
communication: the statistical term is still governed by the original sample
size $m$, while the additional error due to compression is controlled by the
sketch dimension $k$. For Gaussian sketches, we obtain an explicit
high-probability population-risk bound, showing that row subsampling is not the
only possible communication-statistics tradeoff for networked information
aggregation.
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.11032 , 34kb)
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\\
arXiv:2611.11714 (*cross-listing*)
Date: Mon, 9 Nov 2026 00:18:26 GMT (277kb)
Title: Steering Emergent Behavior in Multi-Agent LLM Systems via Information
Networks
Authors: Sepehr Ilami, Babak Heydari
Categories: cs.MA cs.AI cs.GT cs.SI
Comments: 20 pages, 8 figures, 7 tables; supplementary information included as
an appendix
ACM-class: I.2.11
\\
Large language model (LLM) agents increasingly operate in groups, each
pursuing an individual objective while jointly determining system performance.
If an operator controls which agent observes which other agent, but not their
payoffs or messages, how should observations be structured to raise collective
welfare? We make the information network (who observes whom) a design object,
decoupled from the fixed interaction network over which agents act. Ten
identical LLM agents play repeated group-decision games; by default each
observes only an anonymous summary of the group’s previous-round outcome, and a
manager with a fixed budget adds directed observation links that reveal peers’
past actions. Across 1,080 episodes and six games spanning coordination,
anti-coordination, social dilemmas, and discovery, we ask how much information
to share and, at a fixed budget, who should observe whom. Disclosure creates
behavioral coupling: observation acts as a contagion channel whose welfare
effect depends on the alignment between individually attractive behavior and
the collective objective. First, the value of information is
alignment-contingent: more peer information tends to help or be neutral when
individual behavior is aligned with the collective goal, but under free-riding
or congestion externalities it amplifies collectively harmful behavior; in a
public-goods game the group does best with no information at all. We read this
sign separation as a cross-game regularity within one controlled LLM
population, not a model-invariant law. Second, at a fixed budget, who observes
whom matters primarily when coupling is harmful: a modular “barbell” that lets
sub-populations entrench harmful behavior is reliably the worst wiring,
reversing the network-reciprocity intuition from human evolutionary game
theory. These results argue against a default of full transparency for agent
collectives.
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.11714 , 277kb)
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arXiv:2611.11877 (*cross-listing*)
Date: Mon, 9 Nov 2026 04:54:21 GMT (41kb)
Title: Tropical Gaussian Anticoncentration: Optimal Instance-Dependent Bounds
for Online Learning in Extensive-Form Games
Authors: Ashkan Soleymani, Zhiyuan Fan, Lillian J. Ratliff, Patrick Jaillet,
Gabriele Farina
Categories: cs.LG cs.GT
\\
We study the minimax regret of full-information online decision making in
extensive-form games. For prediction with expert advice, the optimal regret is
$\Theta(\sqrt{T\log K})$, where $K$ is the number of experts, or equivalently,
the number of normal-form actions. For treeplex strategy spaces, existing
efficient algorithms, including KOMWU and online mirror descent with the
weight-one dilated entropy regularizer, achieve regret
$\mathcal{O}(\sqrt{T\log|\mathcal{V}|})$, where $\mathcal{V}$ is the set of
reduced normal-form strategies. We prove that this logarithmic dependence is
minimax optimal in the worst-case full-information reward model. The main
difficulty is that pure plans in a treeplex are not independent experts: their
rewards are correlated through the recursive structure of decisions and
observations. To capture this correlation, we introduce tropical Gaussian
formulae, recursive Gaussian expressions built from maxima and normalized sums
which preserve the variance. The index count of such a formula matches the
number of reduced normal-form continuation plans in the corresponding subtree.
Our main analytic result shows that every log-balanced tropical Gaussian
formula with index count $N$ has Gaussian width $\Omega(\sqrt{\log N})$. While
a direct approach struggles to recover this lower bound, our proof uses a
spherical entropy profile to measure scale-dependent separation among the
Gaussian directions, and then applies Tur\‘an’s theorem and Sudakov minoration
to obtain the width lower bound. Applying this result to treeplexes gives an
oblivious hard distribution with valid transition outcome and Rademacher
terminal rewards, establishing a regret lower bound of
$\Omega(\sqrt{T\log|\mathcal{V}|})$. This matches known upper bounds up to
universal constants and shows that the DilEnt/KOMWU dependence on the reduced
normal-form complexity is unavoidable.
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.11877 , 41kb)
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arXiv:2501.10884
replaced with revised version Mon, 9 Nov 2026 17:20:50 GMT (60kb)
Title: Smoothed Analysis of Nash Equilibrium and Fixed Point Computation, and
Efficiency of the Homotopy Method
Authors: Idan Attias, Yuval Dagan, Constantinos Daskalakis, Rui Yao, Manolis
Zampetakis
Categories: cs.GT cs.DS cs.LG
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2501.10884 , 60kb)
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\\
arXiv:2508.08772
replaced with revised version Sat, 7 Nov 2026 17:00:15 GMT (259kb)
Title: Certified Boost Design for Quality-Aware Auto-Bidding
Authors: Huanyu Yan, Yu Huo, Min Lu, Weitong Ou, Xingyan Shi, Ruihe Shi,
Xiaoying Tang
Categories: cs.GT
Comments: 13 pages
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.08772 , 259kb)
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\\
arXiv:2511.19842
replaced with revised version Mon, 9 Nov 2026 05:11:30 GMT (36kb)
Title: Strategy-robust Online Learning in Contextual Pricing
Authors: Joon Suk Huh, Kirthevasan Kandasamy
Categories: cs.GT
Comments: 30 pages. v3 is the preliminary version published at ALT 2026. This
version extends the results to affine pricing policies, improves the regret
and running-time bounds, and bases the lower bound on NP-hardness rather than
ETH, which was recently claimed to be false
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.19842 , 36kb)
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arXiv:2602.11914
replaced with revised version Mon, 9 Nov 2026 12:18:34 GMT (130kb)
Title: When Everyone Can Submit: Designing Contests with Transparent
Pre-Selection
Authors: Hanbing Liu, Ningyuan Li, Weian Li, Qi Qi, Changyuan Yu
Categories: cs.GT
Comments: NeurIPS 2026
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.11914 , 130kb)
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\\
arXiv:2602.20398
replaced with revised version Sun, 8 Nov 2026 20:50:26 GMT (26kb)
Title: Competition Versus Complexity in Multiple-Selection Prophet Inequalities
Authors: Eugenio Cruz-Ossa, Sebastian Perez-Salazar, Victor Verdugo
Categories: cs.GT math.OC
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.20398 , 26kb)
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arXiv:2604.24093
replaced with revised version Sun, 8 Nov 2026 04:55:28 GMT (67kb)
Title: The Power of Menus in Dynamic Pricing: Optimal Regret and Equivalence
Results
Authors: Shiliang Zuo
Categories: cs.GT
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.24093 , 67kb)
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arXiv:2605.06377
replaced with revised version Sat, 7 Nov 2026 11:32:29 GMT (107kb)
Title: Independent Learning of Nash Equilibria in Partially Observable Markov
Potential Games with Decoupled Dynamics
Authors: Philip Jordan, Maryam Kamgarpour
Categories: cs.GT cs.LG cs.MA
Comments: NeurIPS’26
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.06377 , 107kb)
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arXiv:2605.13644
replaced with revised version Mon, 9 Nov 2026 15:17:04 GMT (634kb)
Title: Learning Equilibria in Coordination Games via Minorization-Maximization
Authors: Ashok Krishnan K.S., Helene Le Cadre, Ana Busic
Categories: cs.GT
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.13644 , 634kb)
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arXiv:2606.11160
replaced with revised version Mon, 9 Nov 2026 18:53:04 GMT (57kb)
Title: Fractional Pareto-Optimality in Multiwinner Voting
Authors: Patrick Becker, Niclas Boehmer, Fabian Frank, Lara Glessen, Yeeseok Oh
Categories: cs.GT
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.11160 , 57kb)
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arXiv:2607.27277
replaced with revised version Sun, 8 Nov 2026 12:04:46 GMT (44kb)
Title: Complexity of Strong Popularity in Hedonic Games
Authors: Matan Gilboa
Categories: cs.GT cs.CC
Comments: This version includes additional results: Theorems 1.2 and 1.3. A
preliminary version of Theorem 1.1 in this paper appeared as part of earlier
versions of arXiv:2510.19084, when the two works formed a single manuscript
ACM-class: F.2.0
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.27277 , 44kb)
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arXiv:2609.15841
replaced with revised version Mon, 9 Nov 2026 13:33:18 GMT (90kb)
Title: The Existence of Maximin Share Allocations is $\Delta_2^P$-complete
Authors: Sushmita Gupta, Sanjay Seetharaman
Categories: cs.GT cs.DS
Comments: 58 pages; this version strengthens the main result for additive
valuations; abstract shortened to meet arXiv requirements
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.15841 , 90kb)
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\\
arXiv:2609.24593
replaced with revised version Sat, 7 Nov 2026 21:32:20 GMT (233kb)
Title: Polyhedral Methods for Cooperative Games: Small Lifts and Hard Faces
Authors: Michel Grabisch and. Hans Raj Tiwary
Categories: cs.GT cs.CC math.CO math.OC
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.24593 , 233kb)
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\\
arXiv:2610.29153
replaced with revised version Mon, 9 Nov 2026 01:13:16 GMT (67kb)
Title: Cycle structure of best-response dynamics in random bimatrix games
Authors: Georgios Nikolaos Karelas, G\‘abor Lugosi, Rui-Ray Zhang
Categories: cs.GT
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.29153 , 67kb)
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arXiv:2610.41962
replaced with revised version Sun, 8 Nov 2026 09:25:35 GMT (199kb)
Title: When Is a Game a Markov Decision Process? Correspondences Between Game
Theory and Reinforcement Learning
Authors: Eduardo C. Garrido-Merch\‘an
Categories: cs.GT cs.LG
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.41962 , 199kb)
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arXiv:2604.14886
replaced with revised version Fri, 6 Nov 2026 19:00:53 GMT (3315kb)
Title: Cooperate to Compete: Strategic Data Generation and Incentivization
Framework for Coopetitive Cross-Silo Federated Learning
Authors: Thanh Linh Nguyen, Nguyen Van Huynh, and Quoc-Viet Pham
Categories: cs.AI cs.DC cs.GT
Comments: Competition-aware Federated Learning, Strategic data generation
approaches, A payoff-redistribution based incentive mechanism, Potential
game, Social welfare
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.14886 , 3315kb)
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arXiv:2605.19235
replaced with revised version Mon, 9 Nov 2026 04:58:21 GMT (1309kb)
Title: GAE Falls Short in Imperfect-Information Self-Play Reinforcement
Learning
Authors: Zhiyuan Fan, Gabriele Farina
Categories: cs.LG cs.GT
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.19235 , 1309kb)
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arXiv:2605.30916
replaced with revised version Sun, 8 Nov 2026 02:59:09 GMT (140kb)
Title: Welfare, Improvability, and Variance: A Principal-Agent Approach to
Optimal Benchmark Item Aggregation
Authors: Andreas Haupt, Justin Hartenstein, Anka Reuel, Mykel Kochenderfer,
Sanmi Koyejo
Categories: cs.LG cs.GT econ.TH
Comments: Accepted at NeurIPS’26 Evaluations & Datasets Track
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.30916 , 140kb)
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arXiv:2606.07487
replaced with revised version Mon, 9 Nov 2026 17:34:53 GMT (9825kb)
Title: Modelling Opinion Dynamics at Scale with Deep MARL
Authors: Lukas Seier, Brandon Kaplowitz, Sebastian Towers, Richard Bailey,
Jakob Foerster
Categories: cs.MA cs.GT cs.SI
Comments: 39 pages, 31 figures. Accepted at the 40th Conference on Neural
Information Processing Systems (NeurIPS 2026)
ACM-class: I.2.11; J.4
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.07487 , 9825kb)
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arXiv:2608.06134 (*cross-listing*)
replaced with revised version Sun, 8 Nov 2026 16:29:42 GMT (254kb)
Title: Large-Market Discipline in Combinatorial Double Auctions: No
Recombination, Bundle Selection, and Complementarities
Authors: Konstantinos E. Zachariadis, Yongxin Yang
Categories: econ.GN cs.GT q-fin.EC
Comments: 107 pages, including a 55-page online appendix
MSC-class: 91B26, 91A80, 91B03
ACM-class: J.4
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.06134 , 254kb)
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arXiv:2610.05516
replaced with revised version Sun, 8 Nov 2026 01:14:49 GMT (260kb)
Title: Distributed Learning of $\alpha$-Potential Functions in Strategic
Multi-agent Systems
Authors: Yifei Chen, Chinmay Maheshwari
Categories: cs.MA cs.GT cs.SY eess.SY math.OC
Comments: 15 pages, 4 figures
MSC-class: 91A06, 91A14, 91A10, 90C26
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.05516 , 260kb)
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cs daily Subj-class mailing 20000 51 — Wed, Nov 11
arXiv:2611.13369
Date: Mon, 9 Nov 2026 23:44:36 GMT (39kb)
Title: Enforcing Axioms for AI Alignment under Loss-Based Rules
Authors: Alexandros Hollender and Sonja Kraiczy
Categories: cs.GT cs.AI cs.LG
Comments: Published in the Proceedings of ICLR 2026
\\
Many alignment methods, most notably reinforcement learning from human
feedback (RLHF), train reward models by minimizing a loss on pairwise
comparisons of model responses. Inspired by principle-guided methods such as
Constitutional AI, we treat each principle as a voter that compares responses
according to that principle, for example, preferring the more helpful or less
toxic response. We represent these voters as linear directions in a fixed
embedding space, a simplifying assumption motivated by the Linear
Representation Hypothesis. In this linear social choice model, Ge et al. (2024)
showed that an optimal linear reward model can violate Pareto optimality (PO):
From the principles-as-voters lens, this means a response A can be less helpful
and more toxic than B, yet still receive a higher reward. We ask whether richer
reward models or changes to comparison data can recover PO within loss-based
training. We show that PO can still fail for polynomials of any fixed degree
and one-hidden-layer ReLU multilayer perceptrons (MLPs) of any fixed width $
d\ge 2 $ with suitable finite parameter bounds. We then recover PO for
loss-based training of linear rewards under suitable assumptions in an
idealized setting with uniform comparison directions and equal comparison
lengths. These results motivate dataset design as an approach to recovering PO
in constitutional-style alignment while retaining loss-based training.
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.13369 , 39kb)
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arXiv:2611.14289
Date: Tue, 10 Nov 2026 16:28:48 GMT (666kb)
Title: Adversarial risk analysis with fully probabilistic designs
Authors: Mario Chac\‘on-Falc\’on, Tatiana Valentine Guy, Miroslav K\‘arn\’y,
David Rios Insua
Categories: cs.GT
\\
Adversarial risk analysis (ARA) informs decision-makers when facing
intelligent opponents and uncertain outcomes, enabling an analyst to model
beliefs about the opponents’ preferences, capabilities, beliefs, and the
strategic calculations that opponents employ. Major applications cover
reliability and risk analysis of critical infrastructures in presence of
adversarial threats. In such domains, ARA mitigates typical common knowledge
assumptions of standard game-theoretic approaches. However, ARA entails complex
modelling and computations. To alleviate these, we explore its combination with
fully probabilistic design (FPD), a control theory methodology supporting an
agent in choosing the decision distribution that achieves the outcomes with a
distribution closest to its ideal. We use FPD to model and forecast the
opponent’s decisions within an ARA setting and present how to handle security
games within this ARA-FPD framework, covering both single and multiple stage
problems.
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.14289 , 666kb)
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arXiv:2611.14489
Date: Tue, 10 Nov 2026 18:48:40 GMT (240kb)
Title: Second-Best Trade Is Half Efficient in Multidimensional Markets
Authors: Dirk Bergemann, Yang Cai, Kangning Wang, Jinzhao Wu, Renzhe Xu
Categories: cs.GT
\\
We prove that at least half of the first-best gains from trade can always be
achieved in multidimensional two-sided markets with additive values and costs
and arbitrary downward-closed feasibility constraints. The guarantee is
achieved by a mechanism satisfying Bayesian incentive compatibility, interim
individual rationality, and strong budget balance, and is tight already in
single-item bilateral trade. Types are independent across agents, while the
coordinates of each agent’s type may be arbitrarily correlated. Feasibility
constraints may couple trades across items and agents. This extends the known
tight one-half guarantee for single-item bilateral trade.
Our proof develops a new application of the Cai–Devanur–Weinberg duality
framework. We show that the objective of every feasible dual is at least half
of the first best. Strong duality then yields the guarantee without
characterizing an optimal mechanism or dual. The key observation is that every
feasible dual induces continuous-time Markov chains that, when stopped by
exponential clocks, recover true types as expectations of virtual types. The
dual constraints control the rate at which these chains change the prior
distributions. We establish our bound by combining this control with a coupling
of the agents’ clocks.
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.14489 , 240kb)
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arXiv:2611.14509
Date: Tue, 10 Nov 2026 18:56:27 GMT (22kb)
Title: Artificial Currency and Separate Selling: A 3-Approximation for Consumer
Surplus
Authors: Yang Cai, Yingkai Li, Jinzhao Wu
Categories: cs.GT
\\
We study the allocation of indivisible items to buyers with additive values
drawn from independent distributions. The objective is consumer surplus net of
burnt payments. We consider artificial-currency mechanisms: buyers receive
personalized budgets of a currency worthless outside the mechanism and use them
to bid across items. The better of separate selling and artificial-currency
mechanisms provides a 3-approximation to optimal consumer surplus. The
guarantee holds at every Bayes–Nash equilibrium, without equilibrium
selection. Both branches are necessary: either alone may capture only a
vanishing share of the optimum. The proof decomposes benchmark surplus into a
stable part captured by artificial currency and a variation covered by separate
selling.
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.14509 , 22kb)
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arXiv:2611.13062 (*cross-listing*)
Date: Mon, 9 Nov 2026 17:49:26 GMT (12379kb)
Title: Elicitation of the parameters of a multi-criteria sorting model
Authors: Eda Ersek Uyanik
Categories: cs.AI cs.GT
Comments: PhD Thesis defended at University of Mons, Belgium, July 07 2023. 216
pages https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12907/57144
MSC-class: 90B50 (Primary) 91B06, 91B08, 06A07 (Secondary)
ACM-class: G.2.1; G.2.3; J.4
\\
Multiple-criteria decision aiding (MCDA) proposes models and methods for
different types of decision problems such as choice, ranking or sorting. Such
models involve various parameters that must be elicited. In the elicitation
process, all necessary information has to be taken from the decision-maker. For
this, several direct and indirect elicitation methods are suggested in the
literature. In this work, we concentrate on direct elicitation: we aim at
providing a rigorous elicitation procedure for the parameters of the
Non-Compensatory Sorting model (NCS), which has been characterized by an
axiomatic analysis. A basic version of the NCS model is considered, i.e., a
model with two categories and no vetoes. The parameters are the set of
sufficient coalitions of criteria and the profile separating the two
categories. Regarding the sufficient coalitions, we propose several questioning
algorithms that engraft questions on classical graph exploration algorithms
such as depth-first search. Such algorithms are implemented and evaluated by
simulation. For eliciting the limit profile, we design a questioning algorithm
using dichotomy. Questioning algorithms can be optimal in the worst case or on
average. An optimal algorithm in the worst case has been proposed by Hansel in
the framework of monotone Boolean functions. We implement and evaluate this
algorithm as a variant of the depth-first search approaches. Regarding optimal
questioning strategies on average, we evaluate decision trees for up to four
criteria. On the other hand, we assess how more general is NCS as compared to
MR-Sort, a particular case of the NCS model in which sufficient coalitions can
be represented by additive weights.
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.13062 , 12379kb)
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arXiv:2611.13131 (*cross-listing*)
Date: Mon, 9 Nov 2026 19:15:09 GMT (104kb)
Title: Useful Work Can Increase Energy Use: Demand Elasticity and Proof of
Useful Work
Authors: Isaiah Hull, Or Sattath
Categories: cs.CR cs.GT
Comments: 24 pages, 1 figure
\\
A serious criticism of Bitcoin’s Proof-of-Work is its enormous electricity
consumption. Proof-of-Useful-Work (PoUW), introduced by Ball, Rosen, Sabin, and
Vasudevan (2017), in which mining performs useful computations, was suggested
as an alternative to reduce electricity expenditure, with matrix multiplication
(MatMul) as a recent concrete instantiation by Komargodski and Weinstein
(2026).
Perhaps surprisingly, we show that switching to PoUW may increase the total
electricity consumption, echoing Jevons’ paradox. Intuitively, the PoUW
mechanism acts as a subsidy that lowers the effective price of the useful work.
Recall that demand is elastic if a discount of x percent in the price leads to
an increase of more than x percent in the quantity demanded. If demand is
elastic, the resulting increase in quantity demanded leads to a net increase in
total electricity consumption; if inelastic, total electricity consumption
decreases. Even then, the electricity consumption due to PoUW never vanishes,
since the mining subsidy is spent on useful work that would not have been
produced without the subsidy. This result is proved in a simple model with
electricity-only costs, no PoUW overhead, and an unchanged mining subsidy. The
analysis extends to less restrictive settings with adjusted thresholds.
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.13131 , 104kb)
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arXiv:2611.13224 (*cross-listing*)
Date: Mon, 9 Nov 2026 20:53:05 GMT (21kb)
Title: An Improved $(1+2e)$-Approximation Algorithm for Metric Data Placement
Authors: S. Rasoul Etesami
Categories: cs.DS cs.DM cs.GT cs.NI math.OC
\\
We study the metric data placement problem with site-capacity constraints and
fixed installation costs, aiming to minimize the total cost of placing data
(resources) and accessing their nearest copies. We develop a deterministic
polynomial-time approximation algorithm based on a natural linear programming
relaxation of the problem. Starting from an optimal fractional solution, we
construct multiscale metric-ball partitions independently for each resource and
connect overlapping balls at consecutive levels to form a flow network. The
resource layers are then coupled through shared site-capacity arcs, allowing us
to obtain an integral placement by minimizing a surrogate cost over a single
min-cost circulation. By optimizing the choice of ball radii, we establish an
approximation factor of $1+2e\approx 6.44$. To our knowledge, this is the best
approximation guarantee for the metric data placement problem since its
introduction by Baev and Rajaraman in 2001.
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.13224 , 21kb)
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arXiv:2611.13230 (*cross-listing*)
Date: Mon, 9 Nov 2026 20:57:51 GMT (4316kb)
Title: Dynamic investment and coordination in teams: Theory and experimental
evidence
Authors: David Gill, Victoria Prowse, J. Lucas Reddinger
Categories: econ.GN cs.GT q-fin.EC
Comments: 90 pages, including appendices. JEL: C73, C92, D91, J24
\\
Teamwork requires more than the general skills that team members bring. In
successful teams, members invest in team-specific skill or capital that
accumulates within the team and raises the return to coordinated production. We
provide the first systematic analysis of dynamic investment in such team skill.
Adopting a dynamic game approach, we develop a novel theoretical framework
where investment in team skill creates persistent benefits but is risky because
the benefits depend on successful team coordination. We then take this
framework to the laboratory to study empirically the factors that influence
dynamic investment in team skill. We find underinvestment compared to the
efficient benchmark. However, investment responds strongly to incentives, in
line with specific theory-predicted patterns. Pre-registered traits (theory of
mind and propensity to coordinate) predict investment and team-level
efficiency. We conclude that careful design of team incentives and selection of
team members can facilitate the development of team skill.
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.13230 , 4316kb)
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arXiv:2611.13252 (*cross-listing*)
Date: Mon, 9 Nov 2026 21:24:23 GMT (3228kb)
Title: Splitting for Stability: a Modified Reward Scheme for
Transaction-Fee-Only Regimes
Authors: Eric Brigham, Baigang Chen, Nicholas Hopper
Categories: cs.CR cs.GT
\\
As Bitcoin’s block subsidy declines over time, miner revenue will come to
depend increasingly on transaction fees. In fee-dominated regimes,
winner-take-all reward structures can create incentives for undercutting and
fork-based mining strategies, leading to instability and reduced transaction
throughput.
To prevent this instability, we propose a reward-splitting mechanism in which
the winning block producer receives an $\alpha$-portion of the block reward,
while the rest is distributed among other miners; this incentivizes mining on
previous blocks with higher rewards, while preserving the incentive to produce
blocks with high rewards.
We evaluate the proposed reward structure through analysis and simulation.
Our analysis derives a local profitability condition for one-step Function-Fork
deviations, showing how the winner-side reward, loser-side subsidy, and honest
hash power jointly determine whether undercutting is profitable. Simulations
show parameter regions in which honest behavior dominates fork-based
deviations. In the cases where forking becomes dominant, the learned strategy
is the least aggressive variant studied. The analysis and simulations suggest
that suitable reward-splitting parameters can reduce the honest participation
needed to suppress aggressive forking strategies relative to the
winner-take-all structure studied in prior work. Finally, we show that the
modified reward scheme does not appear to worsen selfish mining incentives.
Together, these results suggest that reward redistribution can mitigate
fee-driven fork incentives without introducing stronger selfish mining
incentives, providing a possible direction for incentive design in fee-era
proof-of-work systems.
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.13252 , 3228kb)
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arXiv:2611.13259 (*cross-listing*)
Date: Mon, 9 Nov 2026 21:30:14 GMT (3409kb)
Title: Choosing Complexity: Cognitive Ability, Overconfidence, and Task Choice
Authors: David Gill, Zhongheng Qiao
Categories: econ.TH cs.GT econ.GN q-fin.EC
Comments: 71 pages, including appendices. JEL: C91, D03, D83, D91, J24
\\
Workers and organizations routinely choose between complex tasks that differ
in their success-payment tradeoff. We study how cognitive ability and
overconfidence shape this choice of task complexity, both theoretically and
experimentally. Consistent with our model, we find that more cognitively able
individuals choose more complex tasks. Conditional on cognitive ability, we
find that more overconfident individuals also choose more complex tasks. In
about 75% of the decisions, subjects pick their payoff-maximizing task, and
higher cognitive ability is weakly associated with more efficient choices of
task complexity. But errors are strikingly one-sided: those who fail to choose
optimally pick tasks that are too complex. Our findings suggest that
organizations should pair task menus and incentives for choosing more complex
tasks with information and feedback that help workers assess their ability and
probability of success. This preserves the benefits of self-selection while
reducing costly overreach.
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.13259 , 3409kb)
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arXiv:2611.14182 (*cross-listing*)
Date: Tue, 10 Nov 2026 15:05:22 GMT (17kb)
Title: Quantum-Assisted Counterfactual Regret Minimization for Bounded-Payoff
Imperfect-Information Games
Authors: Gabriel Maresch, Erik Schulze and Jnan Yalla
Categories: quant-ph cs.ET cs.GT
\\
Imperfect-information games with a graded-reward structure present
significant computational challenges for equilibrium computation, since the
payoff expectations must be estimated across exponentially large strategy
spaces. Counterfactual Regret Minimization over the years has proven effective
for approximating Nash equilibria, but Monte Carlo variants create a large
overhead of sampling costs when the counterfactual values are estimated from
sampled game-tree trajectories. We propose a novel Quantum-Assisted
Counterfactual Regret Minimization, a framework that uses Quantum Amplitude
Estimation to reduce the computational complexity of the regret updates in
bounded-payoff imperfect-information games, while preserving the convergence of
its classical counterpart. We give a theoretical analysis of the resulting
exploitability bound, discuss NISQ-compatible amplitude-estimation variants,
the structure of their resource requirements, and outline what is needed to
validate the potential advantage empirically.
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.14182 , 17kb)
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arXiv:2407.04898
replaced with revised version Tue, 10 Nov 2026 13:01:50 GMT (57kb)
Title: Nash Incentive-compatible Online Mechanism Learning via Weakly
Differentially Private Online Learning
Authors: Joon Suk Huh, Kirthevasan Kandasamy
Categories: cs.GT cs.CR cs.DS cs.LG
Comments: ICML 2024, 19 pages. v3 adds a lower bound on the regret and corrects
minor errors in the published version
Journal-ref: Proceedings of the 41st International Conference on Machine
Learning, PMLR 235:20643-20659, 2024
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2407.04898 , 57kb)
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arXiv:2412.01968
replaced with revised version Tue, 10 Nov 2026 17:26:40 GMT (60kb)
Title: On the Theoretical Foundations of Data Exchange Economies
Authors: Hannaneh Akrami, Bhaskar Ray Chaudhury, Jugal Garg, Aniket Murhekar
Categories: cs.GT
Comments: 40 pages. Appeared at EC 2025
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2412.01968 , 60kb)
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arXiv:2509.05956
replaced with revised version Tue, 10 Nov 2026 13:46:24 GMT (63kb)
Title: Pandora’s Knapsack via Simple Policies
Authors: Zohar Barak, Asnat Berlin, Ilan Reuven Cohen, Alon Eden, Omri Porat,
Inbal Talgam-Cohen
Categories: cs.GT
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.05956 , 63kb)
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arXiv:2602.12253
replaced with revised version Tue, 10 Nov 2026 04:22:24 GMT (40kb)
Title: Is Online Linear Optimization Sufficient for Strategic Robustness?
Authors: Yang Cai, Haipeng Luo, Chen-Yu Wei, Weiqiang Zheng
Categories: cs.GT cs.LG
Comments: Accepted to ACM EC 2026. This version includes a new $O(1)$ strategic
robustness result
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.12253 , 40kb)
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arXiv:2602.22838
replaced with revised version Tue, 10 Nov 2026 06:09:32 GMT (87kb)
Title: How Many Votes is a Lie Worth? Measuring Strategyproofness through
Resource Augmentation
Authors: Ratip Emin Berker, Vincent Conitzer, Eden Hartman, Jiayuan Liu, and
Caspar Oesterheld
Categories: cs.GT
Comments: 61 pages, 3 figures. new additions for this version: stronger results
on majoritarian rules (Section 4), a game-theoretic framework (Section 5),
and a universal lower bound (Section 6)
MSC-class: 91B12, 91B14, 68T01
ACM-class: I.2; J.4
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.22838 , 87kb)
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arXiv:2604.18216
replaced with revised version Tue, 10 Nov 2026 14:08:58 GMT (1350kb)
Title: EFX Need Not Exist
Authors: Hannaneh Akrami, Simon Mackenzie, Alexander Mayorov, Kurt Mehlhorn,
Shreyas Srinivas, Mashbat Suzuki, Christoph Weidenbach
Categories: cs.GT cs.DS
Comments: Substantially revised and expanded version, consolidating
arXiv:2604.18216v3 and arXiv:2605.06451 with further joint results
ACM-class: F.2.2
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.18216 , 1350kb)
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arXiv:2609.29646
replaced with revised version Tue, 10 Nov 2026 17:38:04 GMT (13kb)
Title: Sequential Phragm\‘en Guarantees 2-Approximate Core Stability
Authors: Jianan Lin, Chenhao Wang
Categories: cs.GT
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.29646 , 13kb)
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arXiv:2611.11424
replaced with revised version Tue, 10 Nov 2026 16:43:56 GMT (88kb)
Title: The Query Complexity of Envy-Free Division: Cake, Chores, and Mixed
Resources
Authors: Alireza Farhadi and Mohammadtaghi Hajiaghayi
Categories: cs.GT
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.11424 , 88kb)
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arXiv:2403.01361
replaced with revised version Tue, 10 Nov 2026 12:57:56 GMT (365kb)
Title: Bandit Profit-maximization for Targeted Marketing
Authors: Joon Suk Huh, Ellen Vitercik, Kirthevasan Kandasamy
Categories: cs.LG cs.GT econ.GN q-fin.EC q-fin.GN
Comments: The Twenty-Fifth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC’24).
v3 corrects minor errors in the published version
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2403.01361 , 365kb)
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cs daily Subj-class mailing 20000 51 — Fri, Nov 13
arXiv:2611.14858
Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2026 00:17:32 GMT (60kb)
Title: The Price of Anarchy in Markets for Lemons
Authors: Naveen Durvasula, Tim Roughgarden
Categories: cs.GT cs.DS econ.TH
\\
We study the worst-case equilibrium gains from trade in simple bilateral
trade mechanisms with interdependent valuations. Equilibria in such settings
are typically complex, as proposed prices can convey private information held
by the proposer. Such equilibria suffer lost gains from trade both due to the
inefficiency introduced by screening (as in independent private value settings)
and due to adverse selection. We identify broad conditions under which,
nevertheless, sequential equilibria are guaranteed to achieve a constant
fraction of the first-best gains from trade. Our bounds quantify the central
role of rare pessimistic seller signals and rare optimistic buyer signals. The
results apply to seller-proposer, buyer-proposer, and random-proposer
mechanisms. The key idea in our analysis is to relate equilibrium gains from
trade to proposer profits in an auxiliary market with independent private
values.
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.14858 , 60kb)
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arXiv:2611.14974
Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2026 03:34:51 GMT (78kb)
Title: Who Moved the Frontier? Paying Open Frontier Challenges with Free
Identities
Authors: Luca Zanolini, Duc V. Le
Categories: cs.GT cs.AI cs.LG
\\
In an open frontier challenge, anyone, person or AI agent, submits changes to
a shared problem, and a change that beats the best measured score becomes the
public baseline. How should it pay when identities are free? Rank prizes can be
gamed: on a replay of one track of a recent challenge, one solver’s steps under
two identities would have taken first and second prize. We consider a
prediction-market rule, proposed for machine-learning contests, that pays each
accepted step for the progress it adds; with exact scores, among rules that see
only a step’s start and end, only these resist splitting and merging, and extra
identities gain nothing. With noisy scores and independent normal runs, we
prove that any payment that never takes money back and pays real improvements
also pays something, on average, to a change that does nothing. We propose a
fee per submission, at least what luck pays per attempt, that removes each
attempt’s expected profit if verifiers are honest and no submission is noisier
than planned; nothing enforces that bound, and under noise the rule does not
cap the total paid. If crediting another and faking credit to one’s second
account look the same, a rule that neither rewards fakes nor punishes honesty
pays for credit at most what lying costs. We introduce a royalty on how much a
later gain falls without the earlier change, which needs no claims but needs
removable changes. For five public challenges, we name the rule our results
would support.
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.14974 , 78kb)
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arXiv:2611.15582
Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2026 15:04:33 GMT (52kb)
Title: The Golden Ratio: EF1 and Ordinal-MMS for Additive Goods
Authors: Hadi Hosseini, Shraddha Pathak
Categories: cs.GT
\\
Every complete allocation that is envy-free up to one good (EF1) guarantees
each of the $n$ agents her $1$-out-of-$(2n-1)$ maximin share. Can we construct
allocations that satisfy EF1 together with stronger ordinal maximin share
guarantees? For additive valuations, we prove that there always exists a
complete allocation that is simultaneously EF1 and ($1$-out-of-$\lfloor\varphi
n\rfloor$)-MMS, where $\varphi=(1+\sqrt{5})/2$ is the golden ratio. For
bivalued valuations, where each agent may have her own two non-negative values
for the goods, we obtain a complete allocation that is simultaneously envy-free
up to any good (EFX) and ($1$-out-of-$\lceil(7n-1)/6\rceil$)-MMS.
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.15582 , 52kb)
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arXiv:2611.15774
Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2026 17:51:29 GMT (198kb)
Title: Coverage-Aware Routing with Approximate Equilibrium Guarantees for
Location-Diversity Vehicular Crowdsensing
Authors: Luis G. Jaimes and Ayesha S. Dina
Categories: cs.GT
\\
Vehicular crowdsensing uses the sensors of everyday vehicles to monitor
cities, but traffic concentrates on few roads, leaving much of the network
unsensed. Location-diversity incentives pay vehicles more to travel where few
others go, but our earlier mechanism sets how far each vehicle deviates without
optimizing collective coverage in route selection. We add this step in two
stages. First, a non-cooperative game with diversity-weighted rewards yields
each vehicle’s equilibrium deviation. Second, the platform recommends to each
vehicle a feasible route whose deviation is within a tolerance of this value,
chosen to improve coverage. The coverage gain is monotone submodular, so a
greedy router with local search attains at least half of the optimal gain over
generated candidates. If every active vehicle has a candidate within a
tolerance that is small relative to the aggregate deviation, the recommended
routes form an $\varepsilon$-Nash equilibrium, with $\varepsilon$ first order
in the tolerance, or second order under a stronger condition. On London and
Monaco road networks, the router achieves 99.4% and 98.9% of the optimal
reduction in the coverage penalty on small instances and exceeds closest-length
selection by up to 27.9 points. Under heterogeneous costs, uniform deviation
needs compensation averaging 42% of the budget to give every vehicle
nonnegative utility; the equilibrium targets need almost none. They also yield
more coverage per unit of added travel in most settings and up to 22.6 more
points at small budgets, an advantage that depends on placement and reverses at
large budgets, where detour limits bind.
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.15774 , 198kb)
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arXiv:2611.16207
Date: Thu, 12 Nov 2026 02:59:22 GMT (27kb)
Title: Core nonemptiness for $2/3$-convex games
Authors: Keisuke Bando, Toshiyuki Hirai, Kenzo Imamura, Ryuhei Mizutani
Categories: cs.GT econ.TH
\\
We study the core of $2/3$-convex games, a class of transferable-utility (TU)
games that generalizes convex games, which requires at least two of any three
distinct coalitions satisfy the supermodular inequality. We show that every
$2/3$-convex game admits a marginal worth vector in the core, and hence has a
nonempty core. Our proof is constructive and yields a linear-time algorithm for
finding such a core allocation. We also show that $2/3$-convexity does not
imply permutational convexity in general, while the implication holds under an
additional superadditivity condition on pairs of singletons. As an application,
we introduce a TU model motivated by the OSCE’s consensus-minus-two procedure
and show that the resulting game is $2/3$-convex but need not be convex.
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.16207 , 27kb)
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arXiv:2611.16327
Date: Thu, 12 Nov 2026 05:49:55 GMT (38kb)
Title: Designing Information in a Forest: Algorithmic Aspects
Authors: Konstantin Zabarnyi
Categories: cs.GT econ.TH
MSC-class: 91A68
\\
The Bayesian persuasion framework models strategic information revelation by
a sender to one or more receivers. We study an intricate version of the
multi-receiver persuasion setting in which the communication hierarchy is a
forest - i.e., some receivers observe more informative signals than others, and
the partial ordering of the receivers according to the information they get is
represented by a pre-specified directed forest. This model naturally captures
interactions in hierarchical organizations, and it lies in between the two most
commonly studied versions of Bayesian persuasion: private persuasion and public
persuasion. Inspired by the classic model of private persuasion, we focus on a
setting with a binary state of nature and binary-action heterogeneous receivers
s.t. the sender’s utility is a monotone function of the set of receivers taking
a specific desirable action.
We extend the computational tractability result for symmetric sender’s
utility from private persuasion to the forest hierarchy framework using
methodology inspired by optimal transport theory. We further provide a
polynomial-time algorithm when the sender’s utility is modular. On the negative
side, we show that, unlike in private persuasion, the case of a supermodular
sender’s utility function leads to an NP-hard optimization problem which
further does not admit an FPTAS unless P=NP; this result holds even when each
tree component of the forest is a chain of 3 receivers. To complement the
hardness result, we provide a simple approximation algorithm with the
approximation ratio depending linearly on the depth of the forest hierarchy. We
further provide an analogous algorithm for the submodular utility case.
Finally, beyond forest communication hierarchies, we rule out an FPTAS for the
sender’s optimal utility even in the symmetric utility case, unless P=NP.
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.16327 , 38kb)
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arXiv:2611.16471
Date: Thu, 12 Nov 2026 08:28:49 GMT (259kb)
Title: Accuracy Is Not Welfare: Evaluating AI Buyers under Strategic Price
Complexity in a Synthetic Duopoly
Authors: Ning Jiaqu
Categories: cs.GT econ.GN q-fin.CP q-fin.EC
Comments: 51 pages, 10 figures, 11 tables. JEL codes: D18, D43, D83, L13
\\
AI buying agents may alter sellers’ incentives as well as consumers’
decisions. In a synthetic duopoly, we evaluate price-comparison pipelines on a
fixed menu and in empirical correlated-equilibrium games. Calculator assistance
selects an optimal offer 84.00% of the time, versus 68.57% under verified-total
disclosure, yet disclosure has a 20.14-unit higher consumer-worst equilibrium
surplus. A frozen-strategy holdout comparison favors disclosure, while
re-solving equilibria under scenario resampling produces a range spanning zero.
These model-based results show why accuracy, loss severity, seller incentives,
and welfare incidence require separate measurement.
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.16471 , 259kb)
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arXiv:2611.16496
Date: Thu, 12 Nov 2026 09:02:28 GMT (44kb)
Title: How to Defeat a Mafia (of Size 1)
Authors: Michael Brand
Categories: cs.GT cs.CR
Comments: 19 pages, 2 figures
MSC-class: 68P25, 91A28
ACM-class: E.3
\\
The game “Mafia’‘ is a social deduction game where $n$ players attempt to
uncover a covert coalition of $m$ players among the $n$. Typically, $d=1$ of
the non-coalition players are labelled ``Detective’‘ and have special
abilities. Most game-theoretic analysis considers, however, only the variant
without a Detective. Once the Detective role is introduced, extremely complex
strategies can be employed, for which reason only upper and lower bounds for
winning have been established, namely by considering specific strategies. We
analyse the case $m=d=1$, providing a first example where an explicit,
provably-optimal strategy can be described beyond $d=0$.
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.16496 , 44kb)
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arXiv:2611.16603
Date: Thu, 12 Nov 2026 10:38:21 GMT (42kb)
Title: Regime-Uncertain Data Transactions: A Game-Theoretic Framework for
Self-Adapting and Self-Diagnosing Multi-ML-Agent Systems
Authors: Chethana Prasad Kabgere
Categories: cs.GT cs.SI
Comments: Working paper. Developing for Conference Submission
\\
Autonomous ML agents in large organizations exchange data and model outputs
across organizational and legal boundaries. Which rules bind a given exchange
is not fixed. It depends on where the data subjects live, where the agents run,
who owns them, whom they target, and which version of each rule is in force.
Tags that describe the data can be noisy, and a counterparty can overclaim its
safeguards. We model one exchange as a \emph{regime-uncertain transfer game}
between two ML agents, with an enforcer as a third player. Rules enter as hard
constraints with a strictest-wins structure. Agents hold a Bayesian belief over
which rules apply, can pay to unlock safeguards or verify claims, and then
bargain over the remaining legal bundles.Our method, Legally-Constrained Nash
Bargaining (\LCNB), implements this with a Monotonic Concession Protocol using
Zeuthen’s rule. We prove four properties of the model and test it in a
synthetic simulator with GDPR, DPDP, CCPA/CPRA and a stylised stricter regime.
In two of three stress cases where residence and citizenship differ, a
citizenship-based rule violates in 21–37\% of shared records, and \LCNB{} in
under 1\%. The results also show limits. With our default economics, \LCNB{}
shares almost only aggregates, and its low violation rate follows partly from
that. Violation tolerance, tag noise and enforcement strength matter more than
the choice of bargaining solution.
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.16603 , 42kb)
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arXiv:2611.16880
Date: Thu, 12 Nov 2026 14:44:56 GMT (39kb)
Title: Tight Bounds for Downward-Closed Prophet and Secretary Problems
Authors: Hanrui Zhang
Categories: cs.GT cs.DS
\\
We study online selection problems subject to arbitrary downward-closed
feasibility constraints, under different arrival orders, with different
distributional assumptions. We establish the following bounds: (1)
$\Theta(\log^2 n / \log \log n)$ for the standard (adversarial-order) prophet
problem, (2) $\Omega(\log n)$ for the (Bayesian, random-order) prophet
secretary problem, and by extension, for the standard (prior-free,
random-order) secretary problem, and (3) $O(\log n / \log \log n)$ for the
free-order prophet problem. Together with complementary bounds established in
prior work, these results pin down the asymptotically tight competitive ratios
for all these variants of prophet and secretary problems subject to
downward-closed constraints. Our results refine and reinforce the
big-decisions-first principle by Rubinstein and Singla [2026], establishing a
superconstant separation between the random-order and free-order models.
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.16880 , 39kb)
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arXiv:2611.17148
Date: Thu, 12 Nov 2026 17:33:27 GMT (18614kb,A)
Title: Learning Dynamics of the Influencer’s Game in Resource Landscapes
Authors: Mark Lovett Feng Fu
Categories: cs.GT econ.TH physics.soc-ph
Comments: 23 pages 6 figures
\\
Across domains as varied as ecology, economics, and online platforms,
individuals are incentivized to position themselves within resource-rich
strategy spaces. In this work we introduce a new spatial game framework called
the influencer’s game. Within this new framework players’ strategies are
represented as positions within a trait space. Players then receive a share of
a portion of a resource based on their relative influence at that resource’s
points traits. For the influencer’s game, we show that there is a unique
symmetric Nash equilibrium that exists under strict log-concavity of the
influence kernel. Using the unique equilibrium we show that the stability of
the system depends on the influence kernel’s parameters, number of players, and
the resource distribution shape. For any dimension we demonstrate a stability
threshold that depends on both the scatter and curvature of the players. When
this threshold is crossed, the symmetric equilibrium destabilizes and gives way
to a variety of bifurcation types; including, specialist clusters, limit
cycles, and sub-games that reproduce the larger game’s structure. We ground
these results using real-world data for resources as a demonstration of the
game’s application. Finally we extend the game dynamics to use multi-agent
reinforcement learning and further show that the predicted bifurcation
structure persists under partial observability and discretized strategy spaces.
In all, the influencer’s game provides a novel framework for predicting when
competitive pressure drives convergence versus fragmentation with possible
applications across domains.
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.17148 , 18614kb)
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arXiv:2611.17286
Date: Thu, 12 Nov 2026 18:52:14 GMT (115kb)
Title: Fictitious Play When Agents Are Not Expected-Utility Maximizers: A
Geometric Analysis in $2$-Action Games
Authors: Hao Liang, Solaleh Mohammadi, Kaiqing Zhang
Categories: cs.GT cs.SY eess.SY math.OC
\\
Fictitious play (FP) is one of the earliest and most fundamental learning
procedures in games, where each agent independently chooses a best response to
the empirical distribution of opponents’ past actions by maximizing the
expected payoff with respect to it. However, learning agents may not always be
expected-utility maximizers: they may use nonlinear evaluation functionals to
account for the uncertainty induced by the opponents, e.g., via risk measures.
In this work, we study nonlinear fictitious play (NL-FP), in which each pure
action is evaluated by a general, possibly nonlinear functional of the payoff
distribution induced by the opponent’s empirical belief. To analyze NL-FP, we
first identify a single-crossing property (SCP) of evaluation functionals that
preserves the classical geometry of FP in $2\times2$ games. Furthermore, we
conduct a novel geometric analysis of the convergence behavior of NL-FP in
$2\times2$ games, even when the SCP fails. Beyond $2\times2$ games, we show
that the convergence of NL-FP in $2\times n$ ($n\ge3$) games may fail even for
continuous-time NL-FP, when the two-action player uses conditional
value-at-risk (CVaR) in a $2\times3$ game. In addition, we identify a
finite-crossing condition that ensures convergence of the selected
continuous-time dynamics and the discrete-time iterates in general $2\times n$
games, which also provides new insights into the global landscape of
continuous-time classical FP in such games.
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.17286 , 115kb)
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arXiv:2611.17312
Date: Thu, 12 Nov 2026 18:57:05 GMT (69kb)
Title: The Tournament Equilibrium Set Is PSPACE-Complete, Even under Hereditary
Uniqueness
Authors: Ethan Dickey, Athina Terzoglou
Categories: cs.GT cs.CC
Comments: 51 pages, 11 figures
\\
The tournament equilibrium set (TEQ), proposed by Schwartz in 1990, is a
classical voting rule based on pairwise majority comparisons. Its definition is
recursive: an alternative is judged by the alternatives that beat it, called
its dominators, and by which of those dominators TEQ itself selects. Deciding
whether a given alternative belongs to TEQ was known to be NP-hard and to lie
in PSPACE. We close this gap by proving that the problem is PSPACE-complete. To
our knowledge, this is the first PSPACE-completeness result for membership in a
tournament solution.
The hardness persists even when every nonempty subtournament has a unique
minimal retentive set, the property conjectured by Schwartz to hold for all
tournaments. Moreover, every such subtournament in our hard instances contains
an alternative with at most three dominators. We prove that a single
alternative with at most four dominators suffices both to guarantee uniqueness
and to find a TEQ winner in $O(N^2)$ time. Thus, on our hard instances, finding
one winner is efficient even though recognizing a specified winner is
PSPACE-complete.
We also study how the complexity changes with the dominator bound. If every
nonempty subtournament has an alternative with at most one dominator, the
entire TEQ can be computed in quadratic time; allowing two dominators makes
membership NP-hard. Under the same condition with four dominators, all $t$
winners can be computed in $O(2^t N^2)$ time, where $N$ is the number of
alternatives.
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.17312 , 69kb)
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arXiv:2611.14586 (*cross-listing*)
Date: Tue, 10 Nov 2026 06:42:46 GMT (1249kb)
Title: Finite-Cadence Refresh Equilibria for Streaming Prior-Anchored Ridge: A
Closed-Form Forgetting Window and Spectral Correction
Authors: Mrigank Shekhar Singh
Categories: stat.ML cs.AI cs.GT cs.LG
Comments: 67 pages, 7 figures. Lean 4 formalization and code:
[https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23768172](https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23768172)
\\
Recursive estimators on drifting streams must forget stale data fast enough
to track the target, yet slowly enough to average out noise. In prior-anchored
ridge regression, this trade-off admits a closed-form spectral decomposition in
which each eigen-direction interpolates between the data solution and the prior
with pull weight $s_i = \rho / (\mu_i + \rho)$. When the anchor is refreshed
every $k$ steps, we show that the moving-frame offset converges to a
finite-cadence equilibrium that lags the pure-leaky path by an explicit
$\Delta_k(s)$ while reducing estimation variance by a factor $\Psi(s, r_k)$.
Minimizing the cycle-averaged risk gives $\omega^* = (4\nu^2 \Sigma /
c’)^{1/3}$, $c’ = \sigma^2 d_{\mathrm{eff}}(\rho)$, and the plug-in strength
$\rho^* = \sigma^2 / (n\delta^2)$. A random-matrix deterministic equivalent
extends both laws to finite dimension, renormalizing the anchor to
$\rho_{\mathrm{eff}} = \rho (e^{\zeta q} - 1) / (\zeta q)$; it matches
simulation within 5% at fixed operating points and within 13% at the method’s
own, and rank-deficient populations reduce exactly to their active subspace.
The resulting method, SPAR, calibrates window and strength online from
residuals. On a 27-configuration grid the calibrated window opens on drift
without divergence, and the grid defaults transfer to an hourly electricity
stream and to BCI IV 2b. The core algebra, refresh chain, and regret bounds are
formalized in Lean 4.
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.14586 , 1249kb)
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arXiv:2611.14883 (*cross-listing*)
Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2026 01:18:27 GMT (1312kb)
Title: Random feature policy iteration for inverse mean field games with
complex geometry and high dimensions
Authors: Xiangjian Zhang, Shanyin Tong, Xiaofeng Xu
Categories: math.NA cs.GT cs.NA math.OC
Comments: 20 pages, 7 figures
MSC-class: 65K10 (Primary) 90C30, 91A10 (Secondary)
\\
We propose a random feature policy iteration method for reconstructing the
obstacle function in a mean-field game (MFG) from observations of its value
function, leveraging the method’s mesh-free nature and flexibility to handle
complex geometries and high-dimensional problems. The method builds on a policy
iteration framework for inverse MFGs, which decouples the coupled nonlinear
forward-backward PDE system into a sequence of linear PDE and inverse problem
solves. The fixed random feature representations preserve this linear
structure, allowing the resulting subproblems to be solved by minimizing
residuals at sampled collocation points through linear least-squares problems.
The mesh-free nature of the method further extends the applicability of the
policy iteration framework to inverse MFGs with complex geometry and in high
dimensions. Another key advantage is its flexibility in using different spatial
approximations for different variables: the obstacle function, value function,
and population density can be represented in separate feature spaces,
accommodating obstacles that are substantially less regular than the
corresponding PDE solutions. Moreover, boundary conditions can be enforced
through collocation on irregular domains without constructing boundary-fitted
meshes. Numerical experiments involving smooth and discontinuous obstacles, a
domain with holes, and higher-dimensional problems demonstrate the accuracy and
flexibility of the proposed method.
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.14883 , 1312kb)
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arXiv:2611.15017 (*cross-listing*)
Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2026 04:18:25 GMT (33kb)
Title: Beyond Named Mechanisms: Economic Institutions as a Design Space for
Artificial Agents
Authors: Nikolos Gurney, Fred Morstatter
Categories: cs.MA cs.AI cs.GT econ.GN q-fin.EC
ACM-class: I.2.11; J.4; I.2.4
\\
Multiagent research inherited its economic vocabulary of auctions, markets,
prices, bargaining, and matching from a single observed case: human societies.
Those institutions bundle identity, competence, execution, ownership,
commitment, and settlement in ways that suit agents whose minds are private,
who learn rather than copy skills, and who each persist as one person.
Engineered agents need not share any of these constraints, making the list of
familiar institutions look less like the entirety of economic organization and
more like a sample from a larger, unmapped space. We sketch one way to make
that space concrete: a provisional chart that records each institution,
separately from the agents that run it, as a typed structure over positions,
rights and duties, allocation, information, time, state, process, value, and
external recognition. In this chart, named institutions become overlapping
regions rather than fixed points, neighboring families separate along a few
coordinates, and the gaps between them become places to search. We show what
the shift in perspective buys with a simulation in which one technical act,
copying an agent’s competence, is institutionalized as a new independent
supplier, as licensed capacity that creates no new participant, and as the
splitting of one economic position into successors that inherit some
obligations and not others. In a paired task, all three produce an identical
technical trace despite differing in who exists, who owns the copy, who is
obligated, and who gets paid. We close with a research program: building a
principled chart of institution space, mapping how its implementable region
shifts with agent capacities, and revising the chart wherever engineered agents
expose distinctions it cannot express.
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.15017 , 33kb)
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\\
arXiv:2611.15711 (*cross-listing*)
Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2026 16:53:18 GMT (77kb)
Title: Beyond Worst-Case Online Algorithms via Input Subsampling
Authors: Siddhartha Banerjee, Tianle Jiang, Kamesh Munagala
Categories: cs.DS cs.GT
Comments: Accepted to ITCS 2027
\\
We study whether classical competitive ratios survive input subsampling, when
both the online algorithm and the offline optimum are evaluated on the same
subsampled input. We consider the canonical problems of prophet inequalities
and ski-rental. In these settings, for any single subsampling rate, the
classical worst-case ratios remain unchanged. We ask a stronger question: can
one adversarial input remain worst-case at two distinct rates $p>q$?
For prophet inequalities, in the model where the policy knows the sampling
rate and learns item survival online, every instance has competitive ratio
strictly below $2$ at one of the two rates, and we determine the tight
simultaneous guarantee. For ski rental, in the fluid model where sampling
scales the horizon, the answer depends on $q/p$. Against adversarial
distributions over horizons, one unrestricted randomized algorithm achieves a
strict simultaneous improvement over $e/(e-1)$ for every distribution exactly
when $q/p$ is below approximately $0.34$. Requiring the algorithm to buy by the
breakeven time lowers this threshold to approximately $0.31$, showing that
unlike classical ski-rental algorithms, buying later can provably help in this
setting.
Our results therefore reveal a new form of beyond-worst-case fragility under
input subsampling: instances that are worst-case at one rate need not remain
hard at two rates simultaneously.
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.15711 , 77kb)
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\\
arXiv:2611.15838 (*cross-listing*)
Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2026 18:48:20 GMT (431kb)
Title: Before AI Agents Negotiate for Us: A Competitive Tournament of
Rule-Based, Search, Optimization, Learned, and Language-Model Negotiators
Under Scarcity
Authors: Eduardo de Avila-Armenta, Ra\‘ul Alejandro Aquino-Ibarra, Jorge
Octavio Nicol\’as-D\‘iaz, Umberto Leon-Dominguez
Categories: cs.AI cs.GT cs.LG cs.MA
Comments: 28 pages, 10 figures, 7 tables. Code, data and trained models:
https://github.com/AILabFr8tech/wehaveadeal (archived at
doi:10.5281/zenodo.24122038)
ACM-class: I.2.11; I.2.6
\\
Automated bilateral negotiation underlies two-sided matching markets such as
freight brokering, where many shippers and carriers negotiate price before a
matching mechanism decides who is paired with whom. Prior strategy comparisons
typically use isolated one-on-one duels or a single fixed market, so they
cannot show how a strategy behaves against several live rivals under a changing
balance of supply and demand. We built nine negotiation architectures spanning
rule-based, search-based, optimization-based, imitation-learning, and
reinforcement-learning families, and ran all nine simultaneously on both sides
of a Gale-Shapley matching market under a balanced condition and two scarcity
conditions rotated across all 36 exclusion pairs. In the balanced carrier
market, an imitation-learned engine (ML2), a reinforcement-learning policy
trained only on isolated negotiations (RL), and an expected-utility
optimization engine (OPT) formed a statistically tied top group, and no
architecture led in every condition and role. RL beat all eight carrier rivals
when carriers were scarce, but its match rate collapsed from 62% to 16% when
shippers were scarce and it had to compete with the other carrier agents for
demand. A second reinforcement-learning policy trained against rival agents
(RL2) kept its match rate above 91% in every condition, yet lost on realized
payoff to all eight shipper-side rivals in two of the three conditions, traced
to a confirmed train/deployment feature mismatch. We also tested nine large
language models (LLMs), from 1 to 72 billion parameters, under the same
protocol: they lost significantly to the two strongest engines (OPT2 and ML2)
in 32 of 36 comparisons and won none. These results show that isolated or
single-condition evaluation can hide failure modes that a many-sided,
scarcity-varying, statistically corrected tournament exposes directly.
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.15838 , 431kb)
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\\
arXiv:2611.16388 (*cross-listing*)
Date: Thu, 12 Nov 2026 06:58:56 GMT (3009kb)
Title: Strategically Robust Multi-Agent Control
Authors: Boris Velasevic, Nicolas Lanzetti, Eric Mazumdar
Categories: math.OC cs.GT cs.SY eess.SY
Comments: 16 pages, 10 figures, 3 tables
MSC-class: 91A25, 49N10
ACM-class: I.2.8
\\
A key source of uncertainty in multi-agent systems is the behavior of other
agents. Game-theoretic control approaches ignore this uncertainty, while robust
control approaches treat others as fully adversarial. In this paper, we
introduce strategically robust multi-agent control to populate the spectrum
between these two paradigms. Specifically, in dynamic games, we propose that
players are strategically robust and seek protection against misspecified
control policies of the other players. This formulation induces a novel
equilibrium concept, strategically robust dynamic equilibrium, that
interpolates between game-theoretic control and robust control. We study this
concept across canonical open- and closed-loop settings and show that
accounting for strategic robustness also has computational benefits over
classic approaches in game-theoretic control. Numerical experiments on vehicle
platooning, inventory management, and network control illustrate resilience to
misspecification, and also exhibit a “free-lunch” phenomenon in which strategic
robustness can improve performance or social welfare.
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.16388 , 3009kb)
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\\
arXiv:2611.16495 (*cross-listing*)
Date: Thu, 12 Nov 2026 09:02:06 GMT (484kb)
Title: Verifiable Settlement and Pricing for Local Energy Markets: Architecture
and Deployment on Hyperledger Besu
Authors: Michele Fabi (CREST), Baptiste Leloup (ENSAE)
Categories: cs.CR cs.GT q-fin.TR
\\
We implement privacy-preserving local electricity exchanges using an
automated market maker on the Hyperledger Besu network under QBFT consensus.
The proposed protocol operator collects individual electricity positions
off-chain and publishes aggregate supply and demand on the blockchain, where
smart contracts compute market prices every fifteen minutes. Individual
positions remain off-chain; Poseidon2 commitments and UltraHonk zeroknowledge
proofs, generated from Noir circuits, verify aggregation, payments, and daily
balance updates. The architecture retains community coordination while making
financial execution independently auditable. Signed receipts and
member-triggered recourse prevent unverified or partial settlement. In a
ten-household experiment using simulated US residential profiles, daily
settlement uses approximately 19 million gas and produces eight-member proofs
in 2.4 seconds. Over four simulated days, local trading covers 34.4% of demand
and reduces grid-only costs by 30.5% under assumed tariffs. Numerically
computed __-Nash Equilibrium electricity profiles capture 83-88% of the social
planner surplus.
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.16495 , 484kb)
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\\
arXiv:2611.17223 (*cross-listing*)
Date: Thu, 12 Nov 2026 18:19:37 GMT (28kb)
Title: Combinatorial Bernoulli Factories with Polynomially Many Coins
Authors: Renato Paes Leme, Rad Niazadeh
Categories: cs.DS cs.GT cs.LG math.PR stat.CO
\\
We provide an efficient implementation of combinatorial Bernoulli factories.
Such a factory turns coins of unknown biases $x$ into a random vertex of a
polytope $P$ whose mean is exactly $x$. For every affine slice of the cube (the
class of polytopes that admit a factory), we give a single algorithm whose
expected number of coin flips and running time at every interior $x$ are
polynomial in the dimension and in $1/{\delta_*}$, where
${\delta_*}=\min_i\{x_i,1-x_i\}$ is never supplied to the algorithm. For
perfect matchings this gives $O(n^{8}{\delta_*}^{-2}\log(n/{\delta_*}))$ flips,
while the factory of Niazadeh, Paes Leme, and Schneider [STOC 2021] spends at
least $n^{2n-1}$ flips in expectation at the uniform doubly stochastic matrix.
For other polytopes, our method rounds exactly given a point deep inside $P$
and the promise that $x$ is far from the boundary of $P$.
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.17223 , 28kb)
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\\
arXiv:2611.17252 (*cross-listing*)
Date: Thu, 12 Nov 2026 18:38:34 GMT (66kb)
Title: Sowing the Seeds of Intractability: Kalah is PSPACE-complete
Authors: Ethan Dickey, Ethan Mader
Categories: cs.CC cs.GT math.CO
Comments: 55 pages, 6 figures, 5 tables
MSC-class: 68Q17 (Primary), 91A46 (Secondary)
ACM-class: F.1.3
\\
Kalah is a classic two-player game in the mancala family of sowing games.
Computers have solved several standard-size starting positions, but the
complexity of the game on boards of growing size has remained open. We study
the natural generalization in which the number of pits per side is part of the
input and an arbitrary position is given, with the stone counts given in unary.
We show that deciding whether a designated player can force a win from such a
position is PSPACE-complete. The hard positions have Alice to move first and
both stores initially empty. The same positions are hard under either common
convention for capture opposite an empty pit, and with or without the bonus
rule, which gives a player another turn when the last stone is sown into their
own store.
We introduce Line Kalah as an intermediate problem, a game on a line in which
stones that leave the line effectively disappear and Alice must save each of
her target pits before Bob captures it, and we reduce quantified Boolean
formulas to it. The reduction uses a set of sequential timer piles whose last
stones approach a group of targets, forcing Alice to choose between two
captures in order to set the truth value of a variable, and a final capture
gadget to test a clause chosen by Bob (only one is needed adversarially).
Since either player may move any pile at any time, the stages are placed so
that premature timer firings protect earlier potential targets. For a true
formula, Alice’s strategy against arbitrary opposing play either gains enough
time to save the remaining targets (after Bob deviates from the intended play)
or reaches the final test with a correctly encoded, protected input. Finally,
the line positions are embedded in Kalah with both stores empty. A separate Bob
pit holds the score adjustment, so the winner takes a strict majority of the
stones.
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.17252 , 66kb)
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\\
arXiv:2611.17292 (*cross-listing*)
Date: Thu, 12 Nov 2026 18:53:44 GMT (81kb)
Title: The Submodular Secretary Problem: Tight $1-1/e$ for Monotone Objectives,
and Strictly Between $1/e$ and $1/2$ in General
Authors: Hamed Abdi, Kiarash Banihashem, MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi, Danny Mittal
Categories: cs.DS cs.GT
\\
In the submodular secretary problem with a cardinality constraint, $n$
elements arrive in uniformly random order, and an algorithm must irrevocably
accept or reject each one on arrival so as to maximize a nonnegative submodular
function over sets of at most $k$ elements. For monotone objectives we settle
the problem: the optimal competitive ratio tends to
exactly $1-1/e$ as $k\to\infty$, and its worst case over all budgets $k$ is
exactly $1/e$. The bound $1-1/e$ cannot be exceeded even with unlimited
computation, and it is achieved by a single algorithm with at most $4n+1$ value
queries; previously the best ratio without a shortlist was $1/e-o(1)$, with
exponentially many queries. For general objectives,
where the best known ratio was about $0.107$, we show that the optimal
limiting ratio lies strictly between $1/e$ and $1/2$: we achieve
$1/e+3.5\cdot10^{-6}$ for large $k$, and no algorithm achieves more than
$0.497053$. We also achieve $0.2677$ at every budget. The main new ingredient
of our algorithm is eligibility attenuation: an element that passes the
price test at time $t$ is accepted with probability $e^{-\tau}$, where $\tau$
is the total earlier time during which it would have passed, which makes the
probability that it has already been selected exactly $1-e^{-\tau}$.
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.17292 , 81kb)
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arXiv:2208.04433
replaced with revised version Wed, 11 Nov 2026 01:09:09 GMT (612kb)
Title: Peer Prediction for Learning Agents
Authors: Shi Feng, Fang-Yi Yu, Yiling Chen
Categories: cs.GT
Comments: 38 pages, 9 figures
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2208.04433 , 612kb)
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\\
arXiv:2407.01176
replaced with revised version Tue, 10 Nov 2026 23:35:09 GMT (62kb)
Title: Platform Building with Fake Users: On Airdrop Farmers and Activity
Procurement
Authors: Hanna Ha{\l}aburda and Benjamin Livshits and Aviv Yaish
Categories: cs.GT
Comments: 46 pages, 1 figure
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2407.01176 , 62kb)
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\\
arXiv:2511.09021
replaced with revised version Thu, 12 Nov 2026 08:03:30 GMT (63kb)
Title: Minimal Regret Walras Equilibria for Combinatorial Markets
Authors: Alo\“is Duguet, Tobias Harks, Martin Schmidt, Julian Schwarz
Categories: cs.GT math.OC
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.09021 , 63kb)
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\\
arXiv:2601.15312
replaced with revised version Tue, 10 Nov 2026 00:21:11 GMT (1742kb)
Title: Do people apply different norms to humans and large language models
acting on their behalf? Evidence from norm elicitations in two canonical
economic games
Authors: Pawe{\l} Niszczota and Elia Antoniou
Categories: cs.GT cs.AI cs.CL cs.CY cs.HC econ.GN q-fin.EC
Comments: Previous title: “Do people expect different behavior from large
language models acting on their behalf? Evidence from norm elicitations in
two canonical economic games”
MSC-class: 91A80, 91B42, 91B10
ACM-class: I.2.7; J.4; K.4.2
Journal-ref: Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 127, 104991
DOI: 10.1016/j.jesp.2026.104991
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2601.15312 , 1742kb)
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arXiv:2602.14961
replaced with revised version Thu, 12 Nov 2026 18:59:49 GMT (66kb)
Title: The Distortion of Stable Matching
Authors: Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Georgios Kalantzis
Categories: cs.GT
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.14961 , 66kb)
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\\
arXiv:2608.15247
replaced with revised version Wed, 11 Nov 2026 17:09:45 GMT (25kb)
Title: Improved Metric Distortion Bounds for Deterministic Weighted-Tournament
Voting Rules
Authors: Jianan Lin, Chenhao Wang
Categories: cs.GT
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.15247 , 25kb)
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arXiv:2609.15803
replaced with revised version Wed, 11 Nov 2026 21:21:46 GMT (198kb)
Title: Delegating Authorization to Misaligned Agents: Coalitional Alignment and
Safe Control
Authors: Natalie Collina and Surbhi Goel and Aaron Roth and Sikata Bela
Sengupta
Categories: cs.GT cs.AI cs.LG econ.TH
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.15803 , 198kb)
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arXiv:2609.39532
replaced with revised version Tue, 10 Nov 2026 19:49:05 GMT (54kb)
Title: Tight Liquid Welfare Guarantees for Auctions with Budgets
Authors: Twan Kroll, Guido Sch\“afer, Artem Tsikiridis
Categories: cs.GT
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.39532 , 54kb)
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arXiv:2511.09454
replaced with revised version Tue, 10 Nov 2026 19:37:11 GMT (1115kb)
Title: Individualized Algorithmic Advice as a Strategic Signal on Competitive
Markets
Authors: Tobias R. Rebholz, Maxwell Uphoff, Christian H. R. Bernges, and
Florian Scholten
Categories: cs.HC cs.AI cs.CY cs.GT econ.GN q-fin.EC
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.09454 , 1115kb)
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arXiv:2602.12316
replaced with revised version Wed, 11 Nov 2026 14:48:53 GMT (4917kb)
Title: GT-HarmBench: Benchmarking AI Safety Risks Through the Lens of Game
Theory
Authors: Pepijn Cobben, Xuanqiang Angelo Huang, Thao Amelia Pham, Isabel
Dahlgren, Bernhard Sch\“olkopf, Terry Jingchen Zhang, Zhijing Jin
Categories: cs.AI cs.CL cs.CY cs.GT cs.MA
Comments: Accepted at NeurIPS 2026 Main Conference
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.12316 , 4917kb)
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\\
arXiv:2604.22318 (*cross-listing*)
replaced with revised version Wed, 11 Nov 2026 06:22:13 GMT (100kb)
Title: Strategically Robust Linear Quadratic Dynamic Games
Authors: Boris Velasevic, Nicolas Lanzetti, Eric Mazumdar
Categories: math.OC cs.GT cs.SY eess.SY
Comments: 6 pages, 5 figures, 2 tables. Accepted to the 2026 IEEE Conference on
Decision and Control (CDC)
MSC-class: 91A25, 49N10
ACM-class: I.2.8
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.22318 , 100kb)
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\\
arXiv:2611.11714
replaced with revised version Tue, 10 Nov 2026 22:49:42 GMT (0kb,I)
Title: Steering Emergent Behavior in Multi-Agent LLM Systems via Information
Networks
Authors: Sepehr Ilami, Babak Heydari
Categories: cs.MA cs.AI cs.GT cs.SI
Comments: It is preliminary and is not suitable for public release yet
ACM-class: I.2.11
\\ ( https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.11714 , 0kb)
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VeMail from Veritasium · 1 issue
🔍 The “zeptoverse”: the smallest scale ever explored — Thu, Nov 12
Hi Iniyan, physics went small this week. CERN’s ALICE experiment has, for the first time, measured how kaons, particles carrying a strange quark, interact with deuterons, nuclei made of one proton and one neutron. The trick is called femtoscopy. When a kaon and a deuteron fly out of a collision almost side by side, the force between them changes how often that happens. Sifting 337 million lead-ion collisions for such pairs, the team gauged that force at distances of femtometers (10⁻¹⁵ meters), roughly the width of a proton. Because deuterons contain neutrons, the results offer rare clues to how strange particles behave in neutron-rich matter, such as neutron-star cores.
That is only the first rung: our top stories this week keep descending the metric prefixes, from X-ray flashes timed in attoseconds (10⁻¹⁸ seconds) to a one-in-10-billion decay probing toward zeptometers (10⁻²¹ meters), before closing on a different extreme altogether: atoms chilled to picokelvins.
Coming up:
⏱️New X-ray stopwatch times record-short X-ray laser flashes
🔍The “zeptoverse”: Scientists probe the smallest scale ever explored
🥶China’s space station chills atoms to a record 9.7 trillionths of a degree
+More
New X-ray Stopwatch Times Record-Short X-ray Laser Flashes
A bright X-ray flash in which Rabi cycling and filamentation were observed. (Image credit: SLAC National Accelerator Laboratory/Thomas Linker)
Physicists at SLAC have directly measured how long a hard X-ray flash lasts: 170 attoseconds on average. (For context, 1 attosecond is 0.000000000000000001 seconds or one-quintillionth of a second). That is about as long as an electron takes to circle a hydrogen atom in the old Bohr model. The instrument that clocked these flashes doubles as a stopwatch for electrons.
Hard X-rays have wavelengths roughly the width of an atom, so they can show where atoms sit. X-ray lasers such as SLAC’s Linac Coherent Light Source (LCLS) now make pulses short enough, in principle, to catch electrons moving too. The problem was proving it. Until very recently, their length had only been inferred from spectra and computer models. A ruler of uncertain length is a poor thing to measure with.
In a paper published in Nature, Yanwen Sun, Diling Zhu and colleagues at SLAC and Stanford solved this. Four mirrors split each pulse in two. Tilting one pair of mirrors delays one copy, in steps finer than 20 attoseconds. Both copies then strike a zirconium foil. A single photon from the beam lacks the energy to knock out zirconium’s innermost electrons, but two arriving together can, and the atom then glows. That glow peaks when the two copies overlap. Scan the delay, track the glow, and the width of the peak gives the pulse length.
“Measuring pulses this short is really, really difficult,” SLAC physicist and co-author Agostino Marinelli said of a companion study last month.
Every attosecond X-ray experiment depends on knowing how long the shutter stays open. LCLS now has a measured one. The same mirrors can also fire the second copy as a probe: one pulse disturbs the electrons, and the other records them attoseconds later. That could let chemists watch charge slosh across a molecule before its atoms move. The method only averages over many pulses, so timing each one individually is the next hurdle.
TL;DR: SLAC and Stanford physicists have directly timed hard X-ray pulses at 170 attoseconds, using four mirrors to split each pulse. Knowing the pulse length precisely is a step toward filming electrons as they kick off chemical reactions, such as those in solar cells, which could one day help chemists design better materials.
The “Zeptoverse”: Scientists Probe the Smallest Scale Ever Explored
Visualisation of the decay of a beauty particle into two muons. (Image credit: LHCb Collaboration)
Physicists at CERN have found evidence for a particle decay they have chased for four decades: a particle called a B⁰ meson splitting into two muons, heavier cousins of the electron. Theory says this happens once in every 10 billion B⁰ decays. Its rate is a sensitive alarm for undiscovered particles, including ones far too heavy for any collider to make.
The Standard Model, physics’ best theory of particles and forces, has held up at the Large Hadron Collider so far. Yet it cannot explain dark matter, or why the universe contains matter at all. Physicists suspect the answers involve new particles hiding at distances smaller than the collider can directly resolve. Some now call that realm the “zeptoverse,” after the zeptometer, a billionth of a trillionth of a meter, about 100 billion times smaller than an atom.
The LHCb collaboration, with an analysis led by Harry Cliff of the University of Cambridge, reported evidence for the decay at 3.2 sigma, short of the five sigma needed to claim a discovery. Their upgraded detector, which since 2024 records collisions at up to five times its old rate, used machine learning to pick the signal out of billions of collisions recorded in 2024 and 2025; combining these with older data from 2011 to 2018 gave the 3.2 sigma result. The result is a preprint, not yet peer-reviewed.
A decay can reveal tiny distances because of a quirk of quantum physics: it lets heavy particles flicker briefly into existence mid-decay, even when they are too heavy to create outright. If an unknown particle joined in, it would nudge how often the decay happens. Rare decays make good hunting grounds, because there is so little ordinary activity to drown out the nudge.
This time, the rate matched the Standard Model. That rules out some theories of new physics. “We’re knocking on the door of this zeptoverse,” Cliff said.
Walking through it will take a planned second upgrade, which would gather ten times more data. The UK has withdrawn its share of the funding for that upgrade, putting Britain’s role in doubt, though other partner countries say they remain committed.
TL;DR: CERN’s LHCb experiment has found evidence that B⁰ mesons split into two muons in about one decay in 10 billion, just as theory predicts. Because rare decays are sensitive to particles too heavy for any collider to make, this hunts new physics at ever-smaller distances. More data from the current detector could confirm it, and a planned upgrade gathering ten times more data would probe further.
China’s Space Station Chills Atoms to a Record 9.7 Trillionths of a Degree
Illustration of atoms held in an optical trap aboard China’s space station. (Image credit: Xiaoji Zhou, Peking University)
An experiment aboard China’s Tiangong space station has chilled a cloud of atoms to 9.7 trillionths of a degree above absolute zero, by one measure. That is about a quarter of the previous record, and roughly 280 billion times colder than the faint afterglow of the Big Bang that warms empty space. The bigger prize is time. In orbit, the team could watch the cloud for seven seconds, long enough to turn atoms into far more sensitive measuring instruments.
Temperature measures how fast atoms move, so cooling means slowing them down. On Earth, gravity gets in the way. To stop atoms falling, a trap must grip them tightly, and that grip adds energy. Once released, the cloud drops out of view in a fraction of a second. In orbit, a feather-light trap is enough, and a freed cloud simply floats.
In a paper published in Science, Wei Xiong, Xiaoji Zhou and Xuzong Chen of Peking University, with colleagues at the Chinese Academy of Sciences, describe the experiment. Lasers and evaporation turned rubidium atoms into a Bose–Einstein condensate of about 20,000 atoms, a state in which the atoms behave as a single quantum wave. The team moved it into a wider laser trap, slowly relaxed the trap, then switched it off. How slowly the cloud spread gave its “equivalent temperature,” a measure of motion rather than a thermometer reading.
The seven seconds matter because of a device called an atom interferometer. It splits each atom’s wave in two, lets the halves travel separately, then recombines them. Any difference in how gravity pulled on each half shows up in the result, and the longer they travel, the larger a tiny effect grows. The authors say a space-based version could make “precision tests of fundamental principles.”
Such sensors could map Earth’s gravity to track groundwater and ice, guide ships without GPS, and test whether everything falls at the same rate, as Einstein assumed. If not, Einstein’s theory of gravity would need revising. This experiment did not build such a sensor, though a separate atom interferometer on Tiangong has already tested whether atoms fall alike. The record also carries an uncertainty range of 7 to 13 picokelvin.
TL;DR: An experiment aboard China’s Tiangong space station has cooled rubidium atoms to an equivalent temperature of 9.7 picokelvin, a quarter of the previous record, and watched them for seven seconds. That long, gravity-free view could make atom-based sensors sensitive enough to map Earth’s gravity, navigate without GPS and test whether everything falls alike.
This week we learned…
A look at what caught Team Veritasium’s attention this past week.
Sarah, writer/director: ‘….that a spacecraft doesn’t always enter into a traditional orbit around a body it’s visiting. For the Hera mission to the binary asteroid system Didymos/Dimorphos - the gravitational environment is so weak that the spacecraft instead will fly in arcs around the system, going back and forth rather than circling round and round!’
Sophia, researcher: ‘I recently got crushed in chess by an opening called “The Orangutan” (1. b4), which opens a bishop attack on move two (2. b2). Turns out the name has a funny backstory! In ‘My Best Games of Chess’, Grandmaster Savielly Tartakower recounted visiting the Central Park Zoo right before the 1924 New York tournament. He was so impressed by an orangutan’s climbing skills that he thought the “climb” of the b-pawn was similar. He played it against Géza Maróczy, and named it “The Orangutan”, and is still a fun opening over 100 years later! 🦧 Read more here.’
Matt, publishing lead: ‘At the risk of making this a special Orangutan edition of the newsletter. I learned that they’re only native to two islands, Borneo and Sumatra, and spend almost their entire lives in trees rarely coming down from them!‘
News
The toothbrush that makes its own electricity. Researchers have built a battery-free toothbrush whose plastic bristles generate electricity as they bend, producing molecules that kill plaque bacteria. In a three-month trial of 115 adults, plaque fell about 40%, versus 15% with nylon brushes. Whether it prevents cavities and gum disease over years is still unproven.
Why nothing can be perfectly transparent. Physicists argue that no light-bending material can be perfectly transparent: even ideal superfluid helium at absolute zero leaks light as photons shed energy into quantum sound waves. The loss is minuscule, but it sets a fundamental, not engineering, limit on clarity.
Tracking the uneven jostling of quarks in primordial quark-gluon plasma. Einstein showed pollen jiggling in water reveals the unseen molecules buffeting it. Physicists have applied the idea to heavy quarks racing through quark-gluon plasma, the early universe’s trillion-degree soup. Big jolts, they calculate, are more common than Einstein’s picture allows, and lopsided, favoring sudden slowdowns. Such kicks could expose the plasma’s inner structure.
NASA’s PROMISE rover will scout the Moon’s south pole. NASA will send PROMISE, a six-wheeled, nuclear-powered rover built partly from spare Mars-rover parts, to the Moon’s south pole, with launch targeted for late 2028. Over 18 months it will drill about a meter down, measure radiation and map ice and other resources, helping NASA choose sites for the landers and infrastructure of a planned Moon base.
A room-temperature supersolid brings exotic quantum physics closer. Physicists have made a supersolid, a quantum state that flows like a superfluid yet keeps crystal-like order, at room temperature. It forms from light-matter hybrids in a tiny, voltage-tunable cavity of liquid crystal and organic semiconductor. It flickers into being only with each laser pulse, and samples degrade within hours, but quantum fluids just got easier to study.
A white dwarf was found with two rings of surviving planetary debris. Astronomers have found a white dwarf 1,600 light-years away circled by two separate rings of gas from shredded planetary rubble, a pattern not seen before. The gap between them may be kept open by two rocky survivors, one perhaps Pluto-sized. Our Sun will become a white dwarf too, so this may preview our solar system’s fate.
This Week’s Puzzle
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THE ANT AND THE RUBBER ROPE
This week’s issue has been sliding down the metric prefixes, so this puzzle sticks to the theme of scales.
An ant stands at one end of a rubber rope that is 1 kilometre long. At the same moment, the rope starts stretching evenly along its whole length, at 1 kilometre per second. The ant walks toward the far end at 1 centimetre per second, measured relative to the patch of rope it is standing on.
Each second, the rope gets 1 km longer. The ant gains a centimetre.
Does the ant ever reach the far end?
Elements of Truth Question
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Until next time,
The Ve Team 👋
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